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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

Potpourri II

...

Last month's "Potpourri" version of In Luce Tua elicited a number of favorable responses, not so much for
its content (indeed, it provoked more than the usual
quota of comments calling into question the editor's
knowledge, wisdom, or store of Christian virtue) as for
its form. Those who liked the format fell mainly into
two categories: 1) people whose time is limited (or attention span short) and who therefore prefer brief
comments to extended argument; and 2) people who
depend on In Luce Tua to keep their choler count high
and their politics properly focused and who found our
attention to several issues at once a better counterguide to public life than the normal single-issue format provides. Given that widespread if dubious encouragement, we offer this month a similar sampler.
• There are recent signs, inconclusive but perhaps
indicative, that the domestic debate over Nicaragua is
becoming less polarized than has until now been the
case. The gap between the contesting groups remains
wide, but both sides appear to have moved some distance closer to reality in assessing the situation there.
An honest policy disagreement, no matter how heated ,
marks a considerable advance over a moralizing exchange of conflicting political fantasies.
Those critical of the Reagan Administration's
policies have tended in the past to a largely uncritical
view of the Sandinistas. That is now rapidly fading.
The New York Times, for example, which has given
every benefit of doubt possible to the Nicaraguan government, now writes openly of the Sandinistas' "road
to Stalinism" and concedes that "the pluralist revolution seems hopelessly betrayed." Many other erstwhile
Sandinista supporters have stopped obscuring what
the Sandinistas themselves made no great effort to
hide: that they were and are Marxist-Leninists, and
that their way of governing is not simply a variation
on social democracy.
The evidence is now overwhelming to all but the
willfully blind: Nicaragua is a repressive society that
has no essential regard for civil or religious rights. It
is regrettable that among the willfully blind one has to
include a number of church groups. Pro-Sandinista
enthusiasm exists almost nowhere except in such circles. Theirs is a sad triumph of hope over experience
and evidence.
On the other side of the issue, virtually no one outside the Reagan Administration sees the contras as an
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unambiguous set of "freedom fighters." Those who
support the anti-Sandinistas know full well that they
include in their ranks a number of unsavory individuals and groups. This is clearly a case where one opts
for what seems at best only the lesser evil.
The end of wishful thinking on both sides leads to
no necessary consensus. One can be unillusioned concerning the Sandinistas and still oppose American aid
to the contras. Therein lies a legitimate policy dispute.
What is no longer possible is the fantasy, on either
side, that what is involved in Nicaragua is a conflict between the forces of darkness and the forces of light.
• If there is some progress beyond moralizing in
the debate over Nicaragua, the same cannot be said
concerning South Africa. The case for sanctions there
has been won, that for disinvestment is in full cry, and
those of us who maintain reservations about either
find ourselves hopelessly on the moral defensive.
It is no longer sufficient to declare oneself unambiguously opposed to apartheid. Credentials in the
form of policy prescriptions are now required. Indeed,
one regularly encounters the argument that those
skeptical of sanctions and disinvestment are suspect in
their anti-apartheid declarations: you can only show
yourself to be anti-apartheid enough, the argument
goes, by joining the call for strong economic restrictions. It is frequently implied that behind the Reagan
Administration's opposition to sanctions lurks an insufficient moral outrage over the South African government's racist policies.
The argument for sanctions is not inconsiderable.
Even if such a policy should prove ineffectual, it is
plausibly suggested, it is still required as an expression
of our thorough-going disapproval. The point is not
so much to make a difference as to express an attitude. Fair enough, but perhaps other considerations
might be allowed to intrude.
There is perhaps no white person in all South Africa who has established a more justified reputation
for moral decency than the novelist Alan Paton, author of such eloquent fictional renderings of the case
for racial justice as Cry, the Beloved Country and Too Late
the Phalarope. Paton, whom no one can plausibly accuse
of racial indifference or insensitivity, has recently issued a powerful attack on disinvestment. (The article,
originally published in South Africa, has been reprinted in the October issue of Crisis.) Paton argues, in
sum, that disinvestment will not lead the South African government to change its policies, that it will do
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serious economic damage to poor black South Africans, and that if it does lead to such unrest as to instigate revolution blacks will only suffer.
The point is not that Paton is necessarily right.
Many liberal South Africans, black and white, are sure
he is not. The point is rather that moral anguish leads
in no necessary policy direction in South Africa, and
that people of impeccable moral credentials can doubt
the wisdom of sanctions and disinvestment. Moral gestures and intentions do not, all by themselves, constitute a moral policy.
• The farther we get in time from the Iceland summit, the less clear it becomes what actually transpired
there or what its implications for the future of SovietAmerican relations might be. The spirit of Reykjavik
appears to have been one of utter confusion.
We know that no agreement was reached, but we
don't know if one was genuinely possible or, if it was,
what its precise nature might have been. Some farreaching proposals got placed on the table by both
sides, but the degree of seriousness or good faith behind those proposals cannot easily be measured.
The confusion over the meeting results in no small
part from uncertainty over what it was that President
Reagan had in mind in terms of long-range goals. The
Russians contend-and some of the President's early
comments pointed in that direction-that the U.S. proposed the total elimination of strategic nuclear
weapons within a decade. The President now insists,
however, that he intended only the destruction by
both sides of their ballistic missiles.
The distinction is no quibble: it is the difference between maintaining the nuclear deterrent-though at a
greatly reduced level-and doing away with it entirely.
If the latter was intended, the implications are truly
revolutionary. The entire basis of Western defense
strategy would be overturned at once, and the Russians, given their considerable superiority in conventional weapons and in personnel, would be handed an
enormous short-run advantage. Perhaps more important, we would face a situation where war between
East and West-now, thanks to the nuclear specter,
entirely unthinkable-would no longer be c~nceivable
only to lunatics.
It is difficult to believe that the President meant
what the Soviets-and others-insist that he said. The
confusion in his mind and ours as to where we ought
to be headed in nuclear policy needs immediate clarification. Our European allies are thoroughly alarmed
and our own defense establishment quite bemused.
This is one situation where the President's customary
genial vagueness about facts simply will not do.
That point of confusion aside, it remains unclear
4

what level of arms control short of full nuclear disarmament might be achieveable. General Secretary Gorbachev made bold proposals for reduction of strategic
weapons in Europe and indicated flexibility on other
matters relating to mutual inspection and gradual reduction of nuclear testing, but everything, he insisted,
depends on American willingness to restrict testing of
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) entirely to
the laboratory. Reagan, as he has made clear from the
beginning, will not so restrain himself on SDI, and
thus we stand, as of now, at a stalemate.
Skeptics suggest that Reagan got himself mousetrapped at Reykjavik, that the Soviets knew their proposals on SDI were unacceptable and so made generous offers elsewhere in the comfortable knowledge
that the President would reject them and consequently
suffer the political embarrassment of appearing obdurate. Whatever one thinks of the Russians' sincerity, it
seems clear that SDI is the central issue in the arms
control debate. Its critics think it technically infeasible
and financially prohibitive; beyond that, they say, its
development is incompatible with any hope for arms
reduction. Most of them concede that it may have
served a purpose as a bargaining chip in getting the
Russians to the negotiating table, but they contend
that the bargaining chip should now be cashed in for
an arms control agreement.
We remain agnostic on the question. An arms control agreement would certainly be desirable, and SDI
may indeed be either unworkable or exorbitantly expensive. But if it is workable-and we don't think that
point has been clearly established one way or the
other-it would be even more desirable than reductions in nuclear arms. A substantial defense against
nuclear attack (and it would not have to be entirely invulnerable to serve its purposes) would offer a far
more attractive and stable deterrent to nuclear war
than the balance-of-terror currently provides. Critics
call SDI a Maginot Line in space; they may be right,
but they have not conclusively made their case.
In the meantime, we need not suppose that SDI is
necessarily an ali-or-nothing proposition. The Russians
sometimes seem intransigent on the point, but they
have occasionally dropped hints that there is room for
compromise. That, we think, is the direction in which
American diplomacy should now head. The Soviet
Union may be willing to strike an arms bargain in exchange for some stretching-out of our SDI field testing schedule short of deployment. We suspect that the
bargaining game has not yet fully been played out. ·In
any case, if America does decide to drop SDI, it
should be on the merits of the program, not as a response to Soviet insistence that negotiation of nuclear
policy can only be conducted on their terms.
Cl
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Stanley Hauerwas

A CHRISTIAN CRITIQUE
OF CHRISTIAN AMERICA
Why Both the Mainstream and the Right are Wrong

At a conference on narrative and virtue I had an
encounter with a philosopher that raises the problem
with which I wish to deal. My philosophical counterpart is a Piercian who is also a commited Jew. In his
paper he had argued that most of the rational
paradigms accepted by contemporary philosophy cannot make sense of Judaism. We began by exchanging
views about why current ethical theory seems so committed to foundationalist epistemological assumptions.
We shared in general a sympathy with anti-foundationalist arguments though neither of us wanted to
give up any possibility of some more modest realist
epistemology. We also found we were equally critical
of liberal political theory and in particular the ahistorical character of its methodology. Then our conversation suddenly took a turn for which I was completely
u nprepared. It went something like this:
Philosopher: Do you support prayer in the public schools?
T heologian: No, I do not because I do not want
the state sponsoring my faith.
Philosopher: That is not the real reason. You
are just afraid to be for anything
that Jerry Falwell is for. You really
are a liberal in spite of your doubts

Stanley H auerwas is Professor of Theological Ethics at the
Divinity School of Duke University. His many books include
Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (1975), A Community of Character: Toward
a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (1982), The
Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics
(1983), and Against the Nations: War and Survival in
a Liberal Society (1985). This essay was originally presented this fall as the 1986 0. P. Kretzmann Lecture m
Christian Ethics at Valparaiso University.
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Theologian:

about liberalism's philosophical
adequacy.
That is not fair. I did not say I was
against school prayer because I
think such prayer is coercive,
though I think such considerations
are not unimportant, but because
state sponsored prayer cannot help
but give the impression that the
state is friendly toward religion.
Moreover prayers, insofar as they
can pass muster in a religiously
pluralistic context, are so anemic
that they cannot help but give a
distorted view of God. So I am
against school prayer not because
it is against the tenets of liberalism but because it is theologically a
scandal.

Prayers in the public schools,
insofar as they can pass muster in a
religiously pluralistic context, are
so anemic that they cannot help but
give a distorted view of God. They
should be opposed, therefore, on
grounds of theological inadequacy.

Philosopher:

T hat is not good enough. As a
Christian you typically do not give
a damn about the Jews. You want
to create a civilization and society
and then walk away from it when
the going gets a little tough. Of
5
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course the prayers sponsored by
public authorities are degraded but
they still remind people that they
are creatures. A vague god prayed
to vaguely is better than no god or
prayer at all. Otherwise we face the
possibility of a neo-pagan culture
for which liberal procedural rules
of fair play will be no match.

Pagan societies kill Jews with an

Theologian:

abandon that Christians can never
muster. Christianity, even in a
degraded form, at least has material
convictions that can make the
persecution and killing of Jews
problematic. Not so with paganism.
Theologian:

Philosopher:
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I am a bit surprised to hear you
argue this way. After all, Christians
have persecuted and killed Jews
with as much enthusiasm as anyone. I would think you would feel
safer in a secular culture than one
that is quasi-Christian. Indeed has
that not been the dominant social
strategy of Jews since the Enlightenment? The way to secure
protection from the Christians is to
create and support liberal societies
where religion is relegated to the
private sphere and thus becomes
unavailable for public policy directed against the Jews or those of
any other religious faith.
I do not deny that is the strategy of
many Jews, but I think this century
has shown it to be a decisive failure. Pagan societies kill us with an
abandon that Christians can never
muster. Christianity even in a degraded form at least has material
convictions that can make the persecution and killing of Jews problematic. Paganism has no such convictions so I will take my chances
with the Christians and their
societies. After all, we Jews do not
ask for much. We just do not want
you to kill our children. Living in

Philosopher:

Theologian:

Philosopher:

quasi-Christian sooeues means we
have to put up with a lot of inconvenience
and
prejudice-i.e.,
Christmas as a school holiday- but
we Jews have long known how to
handle that. We flourish under a
little prejudice. What we cannot
stand is the false tolerance of
liberalism that relegates us to the
arena of being just one religion
among others.
So if I understand you rightly, you
are suggesting that you want me as
a Christian to support school
prayer, even if such prayers are but
forms of degraded Christian religiosity, because at least that continues to underwrite the assumption we are a "religious" society.
Such an assumption allows an appeal to a higher standard of justice
that makes the survival of the
Jewish people more likely.
That is about right. You Christians
have to take responsibility for what
you have done. You created a civilization based on belief in God and
it is your responsibility to continue
to suppport that civilization.
But you know yourself that such a
social strategy cannot help but lead
to the continued degradation of
Christianity. The more Christians
try
to
make
Christianity a
philosophy sufficient to sustain a
society, especially a liberal society,
the more we must distort or explain away our fundamental beliefs.
Therefore in the name of sustaining a civilization Christians increasingly undercut the ability of the
church to' take a critical stance toward this society. Even when the
church acts as a critic in such a
context, it cannot be more than a
friendly critic since it has a stake in
maintaining the basic structure of
society.
Why should that bother me? Christians have always been willing to
degrade their convictions in the
past to attain social and political
power (of course, always in order
that they might "do good"). Why
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should they start worrying about
being degraded now? On that score
it seems a little late. For the church
to start to worry about being pure
is about as realistic as Madonna
worrying about being a virgin. It is
just too late. So if you care anything about the Jews you ought to
support school prayer.
Our conversation did not end at this point but it is
enough for my purposes. Even though I think most of
what my philosopher friend has to say is right, for
theological reasons I still cannot support school
prayer. That I cannot puts me at odds with the social
strategy of most Christians, both liberal and conservative, in America. In the next section I will try to explain why this is the case. Then the ground will be
prepared for me to suggest what a more radical Christian critique of America entails both in terms of its
logic as well as a political strategy.
II

Since the turn of the century, one of the dominant
themes in Christian social ethics has been the Christian's responsibility for societal affairs. Time and time
again it is argued that faith and action cannot be separated. Our religious convictions cannot be relegated to
one sphere of our lives and our social and political activities to another. Since the faith of Christians is a
faith that does justice there is no way we can avoid
political activity. Whether the political realm is viewed
Lutheran-like as a realm of lesser evil or more Calvinistically as the arena of the mediocre good, Christians
cannot avoid involvement in the political process. That
is especially the case in a democratic society in which
the actions of individual citizens can make a difference.
Armed with this set of presuppositions Christians in
the "mainstream" denominations attacked those Christians who maintained no particular social or political
responsibilities. This position, they argued, pietistically
relegates salvation to the individual's relation to God
and thus betrays the essential Christian claim that God
is Lord of all creation. What must be remembered is
that Jesus came preaching a Kingdom that makes it
impossible for his followers to be indifferent to the injustices in their surrounding social orders. On these
grounds mainstream churches, such as those that constitute the National Council of Churches, urged Baptist and other pietistic Christians to join them in the
political struggle to make this a more just society. As
is often pointed out, not to take a political stand in the
name of being Christian in fact is to take a political
November, 1986

stand.
Pietists, in defense of their position, sometimes responded by appealing not to their theological convictions but instead to what they considered the normative commitments of the American society-namely
that our Constitution has erected a "wall of separation
between church and state." In the name of maintaining the freedom of religion the church claims no competency in matters political. The difficulty with this
position, however, is that it attributes a perspective to
the Constitution that simply is not there. Neither the
free exercise clause nor the non-establishment clause
prohibits Christians, either as organized in churches or
as individuals, from seeking to influence their society
or government. Just to the extent that the free church
tradition allows itself to be so excluded from the public arena, moreover, it underwrites an individualistic
account of Christianity that is antithetical to its very
nature.

Christians in the mainstream
denominations attacked those
Christians who maintained no
particular social or political
responsibilities. This position, they
argued, pietistically relegated faith
to the individual's relation to God.

Such was the state of the debate among Christians
until recently. But now suddenly everything has
changed because the message finally got across to the
pietistic Baptists. They have become politically active
seeking to influence our society and government to
support causes in the name of making this a better society. Jerry Falwell represents the triumph of
mainstream Christianity in America as he is convinced,
just like Martin Luther King, that Christians cannot
abandon the political realm in their desire for justice.
They must seek through the constitutionally guaranteed means to influence our political representatives to
prevent abortion, to support democratic regimes
around the world, to support Israel, to provide support for the family, and so on.
T herefore the mainstream won, but it is not a victory they are celebrating. For it turns out that once
politically inactive Christians became active the causes
they supported were not those the mainstream wanted
supported. The temptation is to try to defeat this new
political activism by using the slogans of the past-religion and politics do not mix or you should not try to
7

force your religious views on anyone through public
policy-but to do so is to go against the position the
mainstream has been arguing for years.
In order to understand how we have reached this
point in American Protestantism, I need to call your
attention to some aspects of the history of Christianity
in America. I do not mean I am going to give you a
rendition of Puritan America or engage in the debate
about how "Christian" America has been. 1 While such
studies and questions are interesting and may still have
some normative importance, they are not crucial for
helping us understand why Falwell presents such a
challenge to mainstream Christianity. To understand
that we need to appreciate why Christian thinkers
about ethics in America, especially since the nineteenth
century, have assumed that Christianity and democracy are integrally related.
That they have done so is because America stands
as the great experiment in what Max Stackhouse has
identified as "constructive Protestantism." Stackhouse
notes that in Social Teaching of the Christian Churches
Ernst Troeltsch argues that only two major Christian
social philosophies have ever been developed-the
Catholic and the Calvinist. Yet each of these as social
philosophies no longer seems viable. "The vision of an
organic, hierarchical order sanctified by objectified
means of grace, and that of an established theocracy
of elect saints who are justified by grace through faith,
must both be judged as no longer live options for social reconstruction. This is not to suggest that these
visions do not still hold power. . . . But this is to
suggest that these two forms of 'Christendom' have
ended--or rather, have played their part and now
must yield the stage after their immeasurable contribution to the drama of Christianity in modern culture." 2
According to Stackhouse, the crucial question is
1

For an extremely interesting approach to this latter question see Mark Noll, Nathan Hatch, and George Marsden,
The Search for Christian America (Westchester, Illinois:
Crossway Books, 1983). In summary, their position is that
"a careful study of the facts of history shows that early
America does not deserve to be considered uniquely, distinctively or even predominantly Christian, if we mean by
the word 'Christian' a state of society reflecting the ideals
presented in Scripture. There is no lost golden age to
which American Christians may return. In addition, a
careful study of history will also show that evangelicals
themselves were often partly to blame for the spread of
secularism in contemporary American life. We feel also
that careful examination of Christian teaching on government, the state, and the nature of culture shows that
the idea of a 'Christian nation' is a very ambiguous concept which is usually harmful to effective Christian action
in society." p. 17.
2
Max Stackhouse, "Introduction" to Walter Rauschenbusch's The Righteousness of the Kingdom (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1969), p. 21 .
8

whether Christianity can develop another "social
philosophy." If it cannot it would then seem the social
ethical power of Christianity is at an end. Stackhouse
argues that American Christianity has in fact developed a third option, which he calls "conciliar denominationalism. "3
The character of this new form of social philosophy
Stackhouse sees prefigured in Walter Rauschenbusch,
who held together two conflicting motifs, sectarianism
and Christendom, that constitute the unique blend of
"conciliar denominationalism." "On the one hand,
Rauschenbusch came from an evangelical background
from which he gained a sense of intense and explicit
faith that could only be held by fully committed members. On the other hand, Rauschenbusch lived in the
age of lingering hope for a catholic 'Christian culture'
and in an age that, especially through the developing
social sciences, saw the legitimacy of secular realms.
He, like the developing 'conciliar denominations,' saw
the necessity of the select body of believers anticipating the Kingdom in word and deed in good sectarian
fashion, and of taking the world seriously on its own
terms, as did all visions of Christendom. These motifs
conspire in his thought to produce a vision of a revolutionized responsible society for which a socially understood gospel is the catalyst." 4
Rauschenbusch as the champion of liberal Christianity could speak straightforwardly of the need to "christianize" social orders. "It is not enough to christianize
individuals; we must christianize societies, organizations, nations, for they too have a life of their own
which may be made better or worse." 5
On that basis he thought it quite possible to speak
of saved and unsaved organizations. "The one is
under the law of Christ, the other under the law of
mammon. The one is democratic and the other autocratic. Whenever capitalism has invaded a new country
or industry, there has been a speeding up in labor and
in the production of wealth, but always with a trail of
human misery, discontent, bitterness, and demoralization. When cooperation has invaded a country there
has been increased thrift, education, and neighborly
feeling, and there has been no trail of concomitant evil
and no cries of protest. "6
The difference between saved and unsaved social
orders from Rauschenbusch's perspective is quite simple-saved social orders and institutions are democratic. As he says, "social sciences confirm the correctness
of Christ's protest against the stratification of society in
3

Stackhouse, p. 22.
Stackhouse, pp. 22-23.
5
Rauschenbusch, Righteousness of the Kingdom, p. 102.
6
Walter Rauschenbusch, Theology for the Social Gospel
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1917), pp. 112-113.
4
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ranks and classes. What is the general tendency toward
democracy and the gradual abolition of hereditary
privileges but history's assent to the revolutionary dogmas of Christ?" 7 The Kingdom of God is not a concept or ideal for Rauschenbusch ; it is a historical force
at work in humanity. The way it ultimately works its
way out, moreover, is in the form of democracy. As he
puts it, "Where religion and intellect combine, the
foundation is laid for political dernocracy." 8
If, as Stackhouse suggests, America is the great experiment in "constructive Protestantism," it seems what
is Christian about that construction is dernocracy.9 For
Rauschenbusch is hardly an isolated figure in claiming
a close interrelation between Christianity and democracy. As Jan Dawson has recently argued, at the turn
of this century there developed a "faith in the spiritual
oneness of Christianity and democracy, based on the
democratic theology of Christianity and concerned
primarily with the survival of Christianity in troubled
modern dernocracies." 10 To support democracy becarne a means of supporting Christianity and vice
versa.
Dawson quotes Lyman Abbott, successor to Henry
Ward Beecher, in the liberal Christian paper Outlook to
the effect that "Democracy is not merely a political
theory, it is not merely a social opinion; it is a profound religious faith . . . . To him who holds it, this
7

Rauschenbusch, Righteousness of the Kingdom, p. 199.
Rauschenbusch, Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 165.
9
For Stackhouse's own constructive efforts to extend Rauschenbusch's program, only now in terms of human
rights, see his Creeds, Society, and Human Rights (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984). In defense of his position Stackhouse provides a history of the joining of Puritanism and
Liberalism to create the universalistic creed of rights that
culminated in the United Declaration on Human Rights.
He notes that these "principles could not be articulated
in the particular language of Christian piety which had
shaped both the Christian and secular liberal
philosophers who had first developed them. Representatives from many cultures and religions would have resisted overt theological formulations in christological or
deist terms. The principles had to be stated in 'confessionally neutral' terms. But even at this point we see the
triumph of the basic assumptions of the Liberal-Puritan
synthesis. The state itself should not be 'religious.' In this
view the theologically and morally valid state is one limited by righteous principles and one that allows other organizations to define what is religiously valid. In brief,
the 'godly state' is a secular state.'' p. 193. Stackhouse's
account seems far too sanguine about how the obvious
tensions between the Puritan sense of community can be
reconciled with the individualism of liberalism. But even
if that were not a problem one cannot help but wonder
what has happened that a "secular state" by definition
can be called "godly."
10
Jan Dawson, "The Religion of Democracy in Early Twentieth-Century America," journal of Church and State, 27, I
(Winter, 1985), p. 47.
8
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one fundamental faith in the Fatherhood of God and
in the universal brotherhood of man is the essence of
democracy." 11 If democracy was seen as the institutionalized form of Christianity it was no less true
that democracy was dependent on religion to survive.
Thus in 1907, the year following the article by Abbott,
Robert Ashworth wrote in the Chicago Divinity School
Journal that "the fate of the democratic movement
rests ultimately upon religion. Religion is essential to
democracy, and is, indeed, its foundation . It is based
upon the New Testament principle of the equal value
of every soul in the sight of the Divine Father." 12
This kind of direct theological appeal in support of
democracy becomes more muted as Christian thinkers
become increasingly aware of the religious and social
pluralism of America, but that does not lessen their
enthusiasm for democracy as that form of society and
government that best institutionalizes Christian social
philosophy. Reinhold Niebuhr is certainly a case in
point. Vicious in his critique of the theological and social optimism of the "social gospelers" defense of democracy, he never questioned the assumption that democracy was the most appropriate form of society and
government for Christians. What was needed, according to Niebuhr, was to provide a more adequate basis
for democracy in a realistic account of human nature.
Such an account, he thought, was to be found primarily in the "Christian view of human nature (that) is
more adequate for the development of a democratic
society than either the optimism with which democracy
has become historically associated or the moral cynicism which inclines human communities to tyrannical
political strategies." 13
In effect, from Rauschenbusch to the present, Christian social ethics has had one agenda-to show why
American democracy possesses distinctive religious
status. The primary subject of Christian ethics in
America has been Arnerica. 14 This has now even become the project for Roman Catholic social ethics as
exemplified in the work of John Courtney Murray. It
was Murray's task at once to make America amenable
11

12

Quoted in Dawson, p. 48.

/bid., p. 48.

13

Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children
of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p.

xiii. In fairness to Niebuhr, it should be pointed out that
he wrote The Children of Light at the end of WWII in the
interest of trying to deflate some of the more enthusiastic
celebrations of democracy the war had occasioned. Yet
Niebuhr remained throughout his life a firm supporter
of democracy as that social system which best embodies
the Christian understanding of man.
14
For a more complete development of this claim see my
Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society

(Minneapolis: Winston-Seabury Press, 1985), pp. 23-50.
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to Catholic social theory by interpreting the separation
of church and state as a confession by the state of its
incompetence in matters of religion 15 and to make
Catholics amenable to America by showing that Catholics can enthusiastically support democracy as an
imaginative solution to the problem of religious
pluralism. 16 Murray argued even a stronger case by
suggesting that American democracy, whose political
substance consists in an order of antecedent rights to
the state, 17 can only be sustained by the kind of natural law theory carried by Catholicism in contrast to the
individualism of Locke and Hobbes . 18

But the only moral sentiment of public effect is the
sentiment that is embodied in and reinforced by living
tradition. There are no a-religious moral traditions of
public, or at least of democratic, force in American
life. This is not to say that morality must be embodied
in religion nor that the whole of religion is morality.
It is to say that among the American people, religion
and morality are conjoined. Religion in our popular
life is the morality-bearing part of culture, and in that
sense the heart of culture." 20
From this perspective Neuhaus is appreciative of the
19

Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion
and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

In The Naked Public Square, Richard
John Neuhaus argues that among the
American people religion and morality
are conjoined. Religion in our
popular life is the morality-bearing
part of culture, and in that sense
it is the heart of culture.
It is only against this background that one can understand and/or appreciate the work of Richard John
Neuhaus. In his much publicized book, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, Neuhaus
argues that we are facing a crisis in our society. Because religious discourse has increasingly been
excluded from our public life, he fears that a moral
vacuum has been created. This vacuum threatens constantly to be ftlled by totalitarianism, as the isolation of
the individual from mediating structures gives us little
power to stand against the omniverous appetite of the
bureaucratic state. 19
The only way out of this predicament is to mend the
"rupture between public policy and moral sentiment.
15

This part of Murray's work is often unfortunately ignored. One of the reasons for this may be because these
are articles published in Theological Studies, 13 and 14
(1953) called "The Church and Totalitarian Democracy,"
and "Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State." They
are still worth reading.
16
This is, of course, the main argument of Murray's We
Hold These Truths (Garden City, New York: Image Books,
1964).
17
Murray, We Hold These Truths, p. 308.
18
In his An American Strategic Theology (New Jersey: Paulist
Press, 1982), John Coleman provides the best Roman
Catholic attempt to continue Murray's project. Coleman,
however, is much more interested in how Catholicism
can act to renew the ethos or civil religion of America
than the more strictly constitutional issues with which
Murray was concerned.
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1984), pp. 83-86. Richard Taylor rightly argues that no
one saw this problem clearer than Hegel-namely that
"absolute freedom requires homogeneity. It cannot brook
differences which would prevent everyone participating
totally in the decisions of the society. And what is even
more, it requires some near unanimity of will to emerge
from this deliberation, for otherwise the majority would
just be imposing its will on the minority and freedom
would not be universal. But differentiations of some fairly
essential kinds are ineradicable. Moreover they are recognized in our post-Romantic climate as essential to human
identity. Men cannot simply identify themselves as men,
but they define themselves more immediately by their
partial community, cultural, linguistic, confessional and
so on. Modern democracy is therefore in a bind. I think
the dilemma of this kind can be seen in contemporary
society. Modern societies have moved towards much
greater homogeneity and greater interdependence, so
that partial communities lost their autonomy, and to
some extent, their identity. But great differences remain;
only because of the ideology of homogeneity these differential characteristics no longer have meaning and value for
those who have them. Thus the rural population is taught
by the mass media to see itself as just lacking in some of
the advantages of a more advanced life style. Homogenization thus increases minority alienation and resentment and
the first response of liberal society is to try even more of
the same: programs to eliminate poverty, or assimilate Indians, move populations out of declining regions, bring an
urban way of life to the countryside. But the radical response is to convert this sense of alienation into a demand
for 'absolute freedom.' The idea is to overcome alienation
by creating a society in which everyone, including the present 'out' groups, participates fully in the decisions. But
both these solutions would simply aggravate the problem,
which in the homogenization has undermined the communities or characteristics by which people formerly identified themselves and put nothing in their place. What does
step into the gap almost everywhere is ethnic or national
identity. Nationalism has become the most powerful focus
of identity in modern society. The demand for radical
freedom can and frequently does join up with nationalism
and is given a definite impetus and direction from this.''
Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), pp. 114-115. Neuhaus' point is profound, but
I do not see how he provides an adequate response since
he continues to support the political and economic presumptions that are the source of the difficulty.
20
Neuhaus, p. 154.
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Moral Majority (now Liberty Foundation). For in spite
of the crudeness with which they often put their position they have at least raised the issue of the public
value of religion that at one time was the agenda of
political liberals. Rather than condemning the Moral
Majority, Neuhaus seeks to help them enter the public
debate by basing their appeals to principles that are
accessible to the public. "Publicly assertive religious
forces will have to learn that the remedy for the naked
public square is not naked religion in public. They will
have to develop a mediating language by which ultimate truths can be related to the penultimate and prepenultimate questions of political and legal content. In
our several traditions there are rich conceptual resources for the development of such mediating language-whether the concepts be called natural law,
common grace, general revelation, or the order of ere-

ation. Such a civil engagement of secular and religious
forces could produce a new public philosophy to sustain this American experiment in liberal democracy.
The result may not be that we would agree with one
another. Indeed there may be more disagreement. But
at least we would know what we are disagreeing about,
namely, different ac(ounts of the transcendent good
by which we might order our life together. Contra Justice Blackmun and legions of others, democracy is not
served by evading the question of the good. Democracy becomes a political community worthy of moral
actors only when we engage the question of the
good." 21
Neuhaus challenges mainline Protestant liberalism to
live up to its rightful commitment to sustaining democracy as the socially specific form that Christianity
should take. 22 As he puts it, "the main line of the
mainline story was confidence and hope regarding the
Americanizing of Christianity and the Christianizing of
America." 23 Indeed he argues that in spite of their
fervor for disestablishing Christianity in America most

The Time Flowers
21

"Six o'clocks," my father called them, smiled,
And there was a pause that closed
The afternoon like an assignment.
What was humorous waited for the sun
To collapse, the street's children
To tire into ash and drift off
Into houses. The light, then, stretched
Its dream of birthdays to seventy,
What he was watching approach
From the east. At dusk, when we
Followed the outside corn rows
To the wall of the highway,
He sorted the night-sky planets
From stars. The next farm grew houses;
A fever of headlights trailed
A truck. While it passed, turning
To red, to nothing, he dialed
Two hours back in the explanatory dark.

Gary Fincke
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Richard John Neuhaus, "Nihilism Without the Abyss: Law,
Rights, and Transcendent Good," paper delivered at 1985
conference on Religion and Law at Catholic University Law
School. (Unpublished), pp. 14-15. For a similar claim see
The Naked Public Square, p. 36. While agreeing with
Neuhaus that religion needs to help our society discover or
create a moral discourse for the public sphere, John Coleman rightly raises questions about the assumed neutrality
or objectivity of that discourse. Thus he criticizes Brian
Hehir for requiring Christians to come to the public arena
shorn of their particularistic commitments. As Coleman
says, he does not think it possible to escape "the 'permanent hermeneutical predicament' of particular languages
and community traditions in a conflict of interpretive
schemes through the emergence of a common universal
language. I fear that this proposal could court the risk of
a continuation of the pernicious intertwining of an ethic of
deep concern with an ethic of looking out for number one.
But finally, and most persuasive for me, I simply do not
know anywhere else to look in American culture besides to
our religious ethical resources to find the social wisdom
and ethical orientation we would seem to need if we are
to face as Americans our new context of increasing interdependence at the national and international level." An
American Strategic Theology, pp. 197-198. Thus Coleman,
like many Protestant thinkers, calls us to renew the biblical
and republican-virtue traditions against contemporary
liberalism. [This is, of course, the main theme of William
Sullivan's Reconstructing Public Philosophy (Berkeley: U. of
California Press, 1982)]. It is a strange social order indeed
that makes Catholics so committed to making America
work that they accept the project of constructive Protestantism. For a provocative analysis of the destructive results
this process has had on orthodoxy see Vigen Guroian,
"The Americanization of Orthodoxy: Crisis and Challenge," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 29, 3, pp. 255267.
22
Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, p. 121.
23
Ibid., p. 220.
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liberals remain committed to "Christianizing" the social
order. Only the synonyms for "Christianize" today "include terms such as justice, equality, and sustainability."24
That such is the case helps explain the enthusiasm
for the work of John Rawls among those working in
Christian ethics. Harlan Beckley puts the matter well
as he notes that the emergence of a politically powerful Christian right has made vivid a dilemma that
Christian ethics has still to resolve. "The dilemma is:
How can an evaluation of the distribution of rights,
duties, benefits, and burdens which society necessarily
imposes upon all of its citizens be faithful to Christian
beliefs without forcing others to accept the distinctive
moral implications of beliefs they do not and should
not be required to share?" 25

Neuhaus argues that we need a recovery
of some substantive account of the
goods that make a good society
possible through attending to the
concrete desires of real people who
aren't required to leave religion
behind as they enter the public arena.
According to Beckley, "This dilemma can only be
resolved if the justification for principles of justice is
founded upon general beliefs and values that others
hold, or can be reasonably expected to hold, and
which Christians can affirm on the basis of their distinctive beliefs." 26 In order to accomplish this resolution Beckley argues "that the distinctively Christian
moral ideal of love obligates those who adhere to it to
24

/bid., p. 230. For one of the ablest critiques of Neuhaus
see George Marsden, "Secularism and the Public
Square," This World, 11 (Spring-Summer, 1985), pp. 4862. Marsden challenges Neuhaus' contention that religion
is the morality-bearing part of our culture, thus denying
Neuhaus' statement of the problem. As Marsden says,
"Non-theistic secularism also promotes a morality. The
problem regarding public philosophy is not simply that
of whether or not we have morality in public life. More
basically, it is a problem of having competing moral systems and hence less of a consensus in public philosophy
than we might like. Putting more religion into public life
would not resolve this problem unless we decide first
whose religion it would be. In fact, there is evef! less consensus regarding religion than there is on public
philosophy; it is difficult to see how adding more religion
would increase the needed consensus." p. 59.
25
Harlan Beckley, "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls' Idea
of Justice as Fairness-Part I," Journal of Religious Ethics,
13, 2 (Fall, 1985), pp. 210-211.
26
/bid., p. 212.
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embrace the beliefs which undergird John Rawls' idea
of justice as fairness." 27 Rawls thus becomes the language of common grace that continues the project of
Christianizing America.
Of course there are disagreements among Christian
ethicists on this score. Neuhaus, for example, thinks
Rawls' theory threatens to destroy the individual "by
depriving him of all those personal particularities that
are the essence of being an individual."~ 8 As a result,
Rawls' account is ahistorical in contradistinction to the
"Judeo-Christian tradition" which is "premised upon
the concept of real history, real change, happening in
an incomplete universe that is still awaiting its promised fulfillment." 29 What is needed, according to
Neuhaus, is a recovery of some substantive account of
the goods that make a good society possible through
attending to the concrete desires of real people who
are not required to leave their religious convictions behind when they participate in the public arena.
This same set of issues is at the center of the much
discussed and praised book Habits of the Heart. For the
critique of "individualism" that is the hallmark of that
book is but part of a larger agenda that is in essential
continuity with the hope to Christianize America. For
as the authors suggest, in spite of our individualism,
"we have never been, and still are not, a collection of
private individuals who, except for a conscious con21

/bid.

28
Neuhaus,
29

The Naked Public Square, p. 257.
/bid., p. 258. Neuhaus' criticisms are broad strokes of the
much more detailed and refined criticism of Rawls offered by Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Yet
Neuhaus does not explain how he can at once criticize
Rawls on such grounds and yet continue to underwrite
America as the exemplification of what a Christian social
order would look like. For whether Neuhaus likes it or
not, the public philosophy of America is liberal and
Rawls in many ways is its most eloquent spokesman.
The very fact that many Christian theologians such as
Beckley feel the need to adopt Rawls in order to have a
comprehensive theory of justi<;e may mean something
has already gone wrong in Christians' understanding of
the social and political role of the church. Put overly simple, you need a theory of justice when you no longer assume that the very existence of the church is a social
stance. Christian thinkers obviously must and can test
various accounts of justice offered by different societies
in order to find areas of common cause. But it is quite
another matter to assume that in order for Christians to
act politically they need a theory of justice such as Rawls'
that claims to order the basic structure of society. In that
respect Beckley's contention that Rawls' theory does not
pretend to comprehend all of morality fails to adequately
denote the tendency of Rawls' account to render some
goods, such as the family, problematic. See, for example,
A Theory of justice (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1971), pp.
511-512. I am indebted to Mr. Greg Jones for helping
me see this.
The Cresset

tract to create a minimal government, have nothing in
common. Our lives make sense in a thousand ways,
most of which we are unaware of, because of traditions that are centuries, if not millennia, old. It is these
traditions that help us to know that it does make a difference who we are and how we treat one another.
But if we owe the meaning of our lives to biblical and
republican traditions of which we seldom consciously
think, is there not the danger that the erosion of these
traditions may eventually deprive us of that meaning
altogether? We would argue that if we are ever to
enter that new world that so far has been powerless to
be born, it will be through reversing modernity's tendency to obliterate all previous culture. We need to
learn again from the cultural riches of the human
species and to reappropriate and revitalize those riches
so that they can speak to our condition today." 30
Which sounds very much like a call for reconstituting
Christian America.
I have no interest in trying to resolve the many
disagreements between Neuhaus, Beckley, Bellah, and
Falwell. Rather what I have attempted to do is to show
that the reason Falwell is such a challenge to the
Christian mainstream in America is not because he is
so different from them, but because he has basically
accepted their agenda. 31 The Christian right and the
Christian left do not disagree about the religious status
of the American experiment. They just disagree about
what language and/or political theory will allow them
to accomplish their common goal of making American
democracy as close as possible to a manifestation of
God's kingdom.

III
For most Christians in America, from the nominal
Christian, the committed social activist, to the theolo30

Robert Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: IndividWllism and
Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1985), pp. 282-283. For Bellah's more
explicit views see his "The Revolution and the Civil Religion," in Religion and the American Revolution, ed. by
Jerald Brauer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), pp. 55-73.
There Bellah observes that when his original article on
civil religion was published (1967), it came just as the
existence of civil religion was becoming questionable. He
observes, "Only the biblical religions can provide the
energy and vision for a new turn in American history,
perhaps a new understanding of covenant, which may be
necessary not only to save ourselves but to keep us from
destroying the rest of the world." p. 73.
31
Falwell is particularly interesting when he wanders into
questions of international relations. For suddenly he no
longer makes direct biblical appeals but sounds like any
good American realist accepting consequential calculations for determining the right moral policy.
November, 1986

gian, it is simply unthinkable to theorize outside the
tradition I have just tried to sketch. Yet my refusal to
support prayer in school is because I find myself outside that tradition. That I do so is because I do not
believe that the universalism that is intrinsic to the
Christian faith is carried by the culture of the west,
but instead is to be found first and foremost in the
church. 32
From this perspective something has already gone
wrong when Christians think they can ask, "What is
the best form of society or government?" 33 This question assumes that Christians should or do have social
and political power so they can determine the ethos of
society. That this assumption has long been with us
does nothing to confirm its truth.

The Christian right and left disagree
not about the religious status of
American democracy but about what
language and/or political theory will
allow them to accomplish their common
goal of making American democracy a
close approximation of God's kingdom.
That assumption in short is the heritage of what
John Howard Yoder has called "The Constantinian
Sources of Western Social Ethics." It is an assumption
shared by Christians and non-Christians alike, for the
very logic of most contemporary philosophical accounts of ethics and social theory accept its essential
rightness only in secular terms. By calling our attention to Constantine, Yoder has no stake in determining the sincerity of Constantine's conversion or
whether it was exactly at that time that a decisive shift
in Christian assumptions took place. Rather Constantine is the symbol of the decisive shift in the logic of
moral argument when Christians ceased being a
minority and accepted Caesar as a member of the
church. It is that logic we must understand if a
genuine Christian critique of Christian America is to
be made.
32

For an attempt to develop this position see my A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social
Ethic (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1981) and
my The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics

(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1983).
John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics
as Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984),
p. 154. When Christians ask such a question they assume
a m~ority status. In contrast, Yoder's view, as well as my
own, is that Christians cannot help but be a minority if
they are being faithful to their basic convictions.

33
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The most obvious consequence of the change occasioned by Constantine, according to Yoder, is the
composition of the church. Prior to that time Christians had been a minority that at least required some
degree of adherence. After that time everyone is a
member. It now takes conviction to be a pagan. As a
result, Christians are now forced to develop a doctrine
of the "true church" that remains invisible (136). 34
This shift is of crucial importance for how ethics is
now understood. Prior to the time of Constantine,
Christian belief in God's rule of the world was a matter of faith. However with Constantine providence is
no longer an object of faith, for God's governance of
the world is now thought to be empirically evident in
the person of the Christian ruler. With this changed
eschatology ethics had to change "because one must
aim one's behavior at strengthening the regime, and
because the ruler himself must have very soon some
approbation and perhaps some guidance as he does
things the earlier church would have perhaps disapproved" (137). As a result, the distinctive character of
Christian life is now primarily identified with inwardness, since everyone by definition is already Christian.
Once Christianity becomes dominant, moreover, it is
now thought that moral discourse must be that which
can direct the behavior of anyone. Servanthood and
love of enemy, contentment and monogamy, cannot be
expected of everyone. So a duality develops in ethics
between "evangelical counsels" for the motivated and
"precepts" for everyone else. Perhaps even a more significant change is the assumption that the decisive
ethical question becomes "What would happen if
everyone did it? If everyone gave their wealth away
what would we do for capital? If everyone loved their
enemies who would ward off the communists? This argument could be met on other levels, but here the
only point is to observe that such reasoning would
have been preposterous in the early church and remains ludicrous wherever committed Christians accept
realistically their minority status. Far more fitting than
'What if everybody did it' would be its inverse, 'What
if nobody else acted like a Christian and we did?' "
34

All references to Yoder will appear in the text. It should
not be thought that Yoder is committing the genetic fallacy by his appeal to the early Christian community. He
is not saying that because the early church was a minority
it should always be a minority, but rather in this context
he is working descriptively to show the change in the
logic of moral argument when this occurred. Of course
he will argue that the form of the early church is normative for Christians not because it was the early church but
because what the early Christians believed is true and results in Christians taking a critical stance toward the
state. I share that view but I cannot here adequately defend it.

14
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With this new universalism comes an increasing
need to test moral discourse by its effectiveness. Once
the course of history is thought to be empirically discernible, and the prosperity of our regime is the measure of the good, efficacy becomes a decisive test for
the moral rightness of our action. Self-sacrifice that is
not tied to some long-term account of result becomes
irrational. This is particularly important in assessing
the validity of violence and the Christian's participation in war.
What is important about Yoder's depiction of the
change in moral logic occasioned by the Constantinian
turn is that the effects he describes are still with us.
With the Renaissance and Reformation "Christendom"
is replaced by the nation-state. Christians, however,
did not respond to this change by maintaining the cosmopolitanism of the Holy Roman Empire, but rather
now maintained that Christian societies could wage
war on one another in the name of preserving their
Christian culture.
With the Enlightenment, the link between church
and state is broken, but the moral identification of
Christians with the state remains strong. This is especially the case in America where "once the separation
of church and state is seen as theologically desirable,
a society where this separation is achieved is not a

35

Connected with this reversal is what happens once the
ruler is let into the church, for then the ruler, not the
average or weak person, is the model of ethical reason.
Thus the rightness of truth-telling or the wrongness of
killing is tested first by whether a ruler can meet such
standards. Yoder, however, does not mean to exclude
rulers from the church but rather he expects them to act
like Christians. Thus "Caesar would be perfectly free (for
a while) to bring to bear upon the exercise of his office
the ordinary meaning of the Christian faith. It might
happen that the result would be that his enemies
triumph over him, but that often happens to rulers anyway. It might happen that he would have to suffer, or
not stay in office all his life, but that too often happens
to rulers anyway, and it is something that Christians are
supposed to be ready for. It might happen that he would
be killed; but most Caesars are killed anyway. It might
happen that some of his followers would have to suffer.
But emperors and kings are accustomed to asking people
to suffer for them. Especially if the view were still authentically alive, which the earlier Christians undeniably
had held to and which the theologians in the age of Constantine were still repeating that God blesses those who
serve him, it might also have been possible that, together
with all of the risks just described, most of which a ruler
accepts anyway, there could have been in some times and
some places the possibility that good could be done, that
creative social alternatives could be discovered, that problems could be solved, enemies loved and justice fostered." p. 146.
The Cresset

pagan society but a nation structured according to the
will of God. For nearly two centuries, in fact, the language of American public discourse was not only religious, not only Christian, but specifically Protestant.
Moral identification of church with nation remains despite institutional separation. In fact, forms of institutional interlocking develop which partly deny the
theory of separation (chaplaincies, tax exemptions)"
(142).
If there is to be a genuine Christian critique of
Christian America, I am convinced that this habit of
thought, which Yoder calls Constantianism, must be
given up. Otherwise we Christians remain caught in
the same habits of thought and behavior that implicitly
or explicitly assume that insofar as America is a democracy she is Christian. As a result Christians lose
exactly the skills necessary to see how deeply they have
been compromised by the assumption that their task is
to rule, if not the government, at least the ethos of
America.
That is why Christian social strategy in America continues to be caught in a fateful ambiguity-namely,
Christians claim that Christianity, or at least religion,
should be more present in public life yet they want to
make government itself religiously neutral. The history of the Supreme Court decisions on church-state
issues should be enough to convince anyone that there
is no easy way to resolve this tension in the American
legal, much less the social and political, system. 36
Am I therefore suggesting that Christians must
"withdraw" from the social, political, and legal life of
America? I am certainly not arguing that, but rather
I am trying to suggest that in order to answer questions of "why" or "how" Christians participate in the
life of this country we do not need a theory about the
Christian character of democracy. Rather I am
suggesting, with Yoder, that as Christians we would
"be more relaxed and compulsive about running the
world if we made our peace with our minority situation, seeing this neither as a dirty trick of destiny nor
as some great new progress but simply as the unmasking of the myth of Christendom, which wasn't true
even when it was believed" (158).
As Yoder argues, since almost all rulers claim to be
our benefactors in order to justify their rule, there is
no reason that Christians cannot use that very language to call the rulers to be more humane in their
ways of governing. Moreover, if we are lucky enough
to be in a situation where the ruler's language of justification claims to have the consent of the governed
36

For a romp through church-state issues see George Goldberg, Reconsecrating America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1984).
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we can use the machinery of democracy for our own
and our neighbor's advantage.
But we should not, thereby, be lulled into believing
that "we the people" are thereby governing ourselves.
Democracy is still government by elite though it may
be less oppressive since it uses language in its justification that provides ways to mitigate oppressiveness. But
that does not make democracy, from a Christian point
of view, different in kind from states of another form
(158-159).
Perhaps the hardest habit of thought deriving from
our Constantianism is the assumption if we do not
govern then surely society and/or government will fall
into anarchy or totalitarianism. But I notice no shortage of people willing to rule or any absence of
ideologies for rule. The problem is not Christians disavowing ruling, but rather that when Christians rule
they tend to create international and national disorder
because they have such a calling to make things right.
To quote Yoder for the last time, if Christians
"claim for democracy the status of a social institution
sui generis, we shall inflate ourselves and destroy our
neighbors through the demonic demands of the claims
we make for our system and we shall pollute our
Christian faith by making of it a civil religion. If, on
the other hand, we protect ouselves from the Constantinianism of that view of democracy, we may find the
realistic liberty to foster and celebrate relative democratization as one of the prophetic ministries of a servant people in a world we do not control" (165-166).
I am aware that the position I have taken will be a
surprise to most Christians schooled on the assumption that there is an intrinsic relation between Christianity and America. Yet I suspect the position will be
as unwelcome to many who dislike calls like that of
Neuhaus for a recovery of a role of religion in American life. They want people who still use their private
time to entertain religious convictions to be willing to
work to create a social order and corresponding government that relegates those convictions to the private
sphere. That is done, of course, in the name of creating a democratic society that is based on universal
claims justified by reason qua reason. 37 Constantianism
is a hard habit to break even for those who no longer
understand themselves to be religious.
37

It is interesting to observe that most Americans, whether
religious or secular, continue to take a missionary stance
for democracy. Americans criticize our government's
support for non-democratic regimes around the world to
the point of sometimes advocating intervention against
nondemocratic regimes. As Yoder observes, "after the
'Christian west' has lost the naive righteousness with
which it thought it should export its religion around the
world, we still seem to have a good conscience about exporting our politics" (151).
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From this perspective the problem with Yoder (and
Falwell) is their refusal to find a neutral or at least
non-confrontational way to state the social implications
of their religious convictions. 38 That is not playing the
game fairly as it makes religion more public than is
healthy for an allegedly pluralistic society. After all
there have to be some limits to our pluralism.
Of course Yoder might well respond that he is willing on a case-by-case basis pragmatically to use the allegedly more universal language of our society. But
for many I suspect such a pragmatic approach would
be insufficient. It is not enough to be willing to play
the game of the putative neutral or objective language
and procedures of pluralist democracy; you must be
willing to believe that such a language and procedures
are truly the form of the society any people anywhere
would choose if they had the material means, institutional creativity, and philosophical acumen. To challenge that presumption, as Yoder has, I think is the
necessary starting point for any genuine Christian
critique of Christian America.
IV
But where does this leave us? If America is not the
"new Jerusalem" does that mean Christians must seek
to make America live consistent with secular presuppositions? In order to make the line between being
Christian and American clear must we side with those
who wish to force any religious phenomenon out of
the public arena? Should we rejoice in the destructive
kind of individualism that is so graphically displayed
in Habits of the Heart? Do we not have a stake in sustaining a public ethos that might make the rise of
paganism, which might well use the language of Christianity, less likely?
I see no reason that the position I have taken would
make me give an affirmative answer to these questions. I believe that Christians should not will that secular society be more unjust than it already has a tendency to be. Therefore we have a stake in fostering
those forms of human association that ensure that the
virtues can be sustained. Virtues make it possible to
sustain a society committed to working out differences
short of violence. What I fear, however, is that in the
absence of those associations we will seek to solve the
moral anomie of the American people through state
action or by a coercive reclaiming of Christian

America.
Therefore if I refuse to support prayer in the public
schools it becomes all the more important that I urge
Christians to learn to pray authentically as Christians.
For if Christians reclaim prayer as an end in itself
rather than as a way to confirm the "Christian nature"
of our society we will perform our most important
civic responsibility. For as Origen argued, what more
important public service can we render than to pray
that the emperor recognize his or her status as a creature of God? Such a prayer is no less significant in a
society that believes "the people" have in fact become
the emperor.
Cl

Self-Portrait
Scattered notes, without sequence, like dreams,
like a life all made up of fragments .
-Paul Gaugin

Not a book, Gaugin protests. His hut wears
its roof of woven cocoa leaves. Breadfruit
trees surround it, wild bananas stalk humid
mountains of Atuana gorge. Not a book, but
memories whose remnants lay in disarray,
like Van Gogh's atelier in Aries, where oil
tubes tumble from the color-box; canvasses,
sketches stack in corners. Still sunblind
from Van Gogh's yellow chrome on violet,
Gaugin dreams: Van Gogh again, in Paris,
where December snow shrouds Rue Lepic.
Shivering in his sheepskin coat, his hat
of rabbit fur, he hurries to the outer
boulevards. Under arm, he tucked "Pink
Shrimp," wrapped in white butcher paper, to
trade for rent. Among old iron work, arrows
cheap paintings, he leaves his still life
done on pink paper, takes a five-franc coin
which bounces across the counter, rolls
into the hand a beggar proffers, in tattered
shawl and toothless smile-so much for dreams.
The day grows warm. Sun spills down valley
like juice from a lemon wedge Gaugin
squeezed against the goblet's rim; he
watches water turn into a factory of light
like Aries after rain. Van Gogh was right.

38 By

associating Yoder and Falwell at this point, I do not
mean to deny their obvious differences. Yet they both
use primary religious language in the public arena without apology. The problem with Falwell is not that he uses
Christian appeals but that his understanding of Christianity is so attenuated.
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Going Soft and
Shaping Up
Richard Maxwell
Thus far, the big Hollywood
movies of 1986 are Top Gun and
Aliens. Since both are silly, I feel a
bit awkward about wanting to dwell
on them. Furthermore: isn't the
contrast already obvious? We suffer
a right-wing fantasy about strong
men in their airplanes saving
America from terrorists-and then,
just when we thought it was safe to
go back to the movies, we have to
sit through a left-wing fantasy of
the strong woman with her
machine-gun saving the nuclear
family from bad corporations and
monsters who are worse yet.
Choose your favorite wish-fulfillment: popular culture provides it
for you, price no object.
The moral is drawn. Now I plan
to enjoy myself. As Ferdinand
Braudel once remarked, "Le bon
dieu est dans le detail. " What will interest me is the quality of eclecticism in these films, and-by a
corollary-the kinds of silliness they
commit, the ways in which they
struggle with their own political
and social assumptions. By attempting this anatomy I accomplish two
goals. I help save my brain, and
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possibly yours, from turning into
oatmeal. Moreover, I have the pleasure of discerning some surprises
where all might have seemed
foreordained .
We attend Top Gun for shots of
big planes zooming through the
sky, doing dangerous stunts while
thematically appropriate rock music
plays. Military action is taken to be
an improved form of sex: "Ah
think ah'm a-gettin' a hard-on!"
cries one pilot ecstatically as he accelerates. The producers provide
lots of these sequences; in between
we have Tom Cruise trying to bed
a woman taller than he is (his instructor at the Top Gun institute
for fighter pilots). This difficult but
worthy project is finally brought to
a successful conclusion in a lowrent cottage along a stunning bit of
southern coast. Why is the low-rent
cottage still there? Why have condos not gone up? The question remains unanswered as a national
emergency occurs and Tom, back
in his plane, helps subdue threatening MIGs containing pilots quite a
bit more competent than Ghadaffi's.
The important word is "helps."
Heroes of this sort are supposed to
triumph all by themselves. We remember-nostalgically, some of
us-how James Caan killed the entire opposing team during the last,
great game of Rollerball, mostly by
smashing their brains out with his
roller-put (or whatever it was
called). Caan wasn't supposed to do
that. His corporate sponsors had
insisted that the team function as a
team, that no individual stand out
from the social unit even during
the excitement of the Superderby
(or whatever it was called). Against
all odds, Caan proved that heroes
are still heroes.
Even in The Right Stuff-a more
thoughtful depiction of athletic-military heroism-we had Sam Shepherd, playing test pilot Chuck
Yeager, to keep the old lore alive.

Stuff emphasized the story of the
first astronauts, but it frequently
cut to scenes of Yeager-their immediate predecessor-doing crazy,
spectacular, or just lonesome cowboy things (like sitting on his favorite horse, watching his favorite
plane).
Grissom, Glenn and the rest may
have been part of a vast machine
for public relations and scientific
research-not Chuck, it was implied. He was out there by himself,
doing what he had to do. This point
was somewhat obscured when Stuff
had its first TV showings and the
real Chuck Yeager kept coming on
in motor oil commercials. Nonetheless the Yeager legend thrives-and
with it a longstanding model for
American heroism.

What interests me in
Top Gun and Aliens is
their eclecticism and,
as a corollary, the kinds
of silliness they commit.
Thus the peculiarity of Top Gun.
It starts out in traditional fashion,
with the protagonist demonstrating
his cool, his ability to think under
pressure, etc. It also sets up the
usual conflict. How can somebody
like this function within the system?
Don't the qualities that make him a
good pilot make him an improbable member of a team? (Yeager
knew he didn't want to be an astronaut.) The (initially) surprising
part is that this conflict is resolved
without any of Rollerball's jangling
glorification of violence or Stuffs
pseudo-poetic maundering.
Tom simply learns to conform,
which in this case means to work
with the other guys. There are
events along the way. His partner
dies, he finds out new things about
his father, who was also a fighterpilot, he has his little romance.
None of this is convincingly con17

nected to his sudden integration
into his fighting unit. Nor-it
seems in retrospect--does it need
to be. Tom Cruise has never played
the kind of guy who would stand
out from a crowd.
True, in Risky Business he did
outrageous things like turning his
parent's home into a brothel, but
his real goal was to be admitted to
Princeton. Risks worked for him as
a means to an end, i.e., the most
conventional sort of respectability.
We might, then, say that the conclusion of Top Gun rings true while
the rest is held in memory as a particularly improbable fiction. In effect, we have just witnessed the
death, the last rites, and the interment of John Wayne ...
. . . until h.e is reborn in the person of Sigourney Weaver. Alien
(1979) lays the groundwork for this
odd transmigration of souls. After
he has been inseminated by a slimy
pod on an unpleasant planet, a crew
member returns to the spaceship
Nostromo. Weaver, called Ripley, is
against admitting him; she argues
that he should remain in quarantine.
Somehow he is allowed to enter, a
determined
crab-thing
clinging,
now, to his face. The crab-thing
drops off and dies but a spikytoothed monster bursts from the unfortunate crew-member's stomach.
The Nostromo's computer, Mother,
tries to ensure that the monster is
transported back to an organization
named, simply, The Company. Here
it will find some sort of horrible military use. With the help of Parker, a
black worker on board the Nostromo,
Ripley saves the ship's cat from destruction and shoots the alien itself
out of the craft. Mother is "Mother,
you bitch," the alien "you son of a
bitch." Ripley defeats them both.
As has been observed by numerous viewers, Alien has one seemingly
gratuitous weak point. Why would
Ripley risk everything going back
for the cat when it was she who had
argued against letting in a desper18

ately-ill crew member? Surely she
hadn't softened up; she got tougher
and thought more as the film went
on, rather than vice-versa. A striking
Marxist polemic of the time had it
that Alien booted old-fashioned sentimental humanism out the front
door only to let it in the back
Games Kavanaugh, October, Summer, 1980).

Aliens gives liberals
their chance to prove
that they're not wimps,
that they can outtough
even Sylvester Stallone.
I suppose this is true, more or
less. All the same, the gesture was
half-hearted, vague, no matter how
faithfully one tried to clarify it or
pin it down with clever theoretical
analyses. It really wasn't clear how
Alien's liberal cliches (the strong
woman, the sacrificial black man, the
sinister corporation) hung together
. . . if indeed they did . It took a
sequel, Aliens, to draw out the sillier
possibilities of this material-which
proved to harmonize wonderfully
with the obsessions of its director,
James Cameron.
Cameron wrote an early draft of
Rambo, which was later revised by
Sylvester Stallone. After that he directed The Terminator, where Arnold
Schwarzenegger is a ruthless robotassassin: Schwarzenegger tries to kill
the future mother of the man who
will lead the ultimate human resistance in the coming war of humans
against machines.
Aliens synthesizes these motifs.
Ripley returns to the nasty planet of
the alien with a group of Vietnamveteran-type marines. This time, instead of fighting against the Mother
computer, she fights against the
Mother alien (also a "bitch"); instead
of going back for kitty, she goes
back for a little girl who has brought

out her maternal instincts; instead of
remaining fundamentally cool and
rational (her character in the original film) she becomes a good, i.e.,
feminist and maternal, RamboCameron's penance for the bad male
Rambo shaped from his original
script by Stallone. To fight one
bitch, she has to become another.
It's possible to see why Aliens got
so much attention in certain critical
quarters. Occasionally one can spot a
liberal on , let's say, the McLaughlin
Group (PBS), squeaking that he's
rougher and more ruthless than Pat
Buchanan and Caspar Weinberger
put together. Aliens gives liberals a
chance to prove that they're not
wimps, that they can outtough even
Sylvester Stallone if necessary. The
paper falling most spectacularly for
this line was the Village Voice, which
ran a long and generally admiring
feature emphasizing the Rambo connection almost to the exclusion of
everything else. However, this sort
of admiration assumes a lot-rather
too much I would think.
The best that can be said for
Cameron is that he knows how to
cook up a plot gripping to any audience, no matter how limited its attention-span. The worst is that he
writes and directs as though he had
never read anything but Marvel
comic books. There's a lot to be said
for Marvel comic books-and arguably Cameron's ignorance gives him
a kind of invincibility. He has the
strength of ten because his heart is
pure. On the other hand, thoughtless ignorance seldom permits the
emergence of a good storyteller,
especially if his story is designed
along argumentative lines.
The moment we inquire into the
argument behind Aliens' plot, things
get murky fast. The basic claim
would have to go as follows: "Ripley
kills the aliens ruthlessly-in fact she
embarks on a self-announced program of genocide, but good genocide."
And how can you tell good
genocide? "First, when it's commitThe Cresset

ted on behalf of motherhood; second, when it is balanced by toleration for creatures who are different
but friendly-like the robot whom
Ripley learns to trust, despite her
justified
fear
of
human-like
machines, even while she is mowing
down the bad mother and her
abominable offspring."
To put the point another way, this
movie works very hard to establish a
set of circumstances where anyone,
no matter how dewy-eyed, can approve of behavior that out-Rambos
Rambo. But our guilt in approving
of such actions is gone: as Mr. Hyde
cries when he bursts from Jekyll's
office, "'Free! Free at last!' "
I eliminated all suspense from this
essay by drawing a moral at the beginning. The moral can be refined.
Conservatives out of power tend to
be a bloodthirsty lot. Since they've
arrived in vogue and office, they
have started to become somewhat
civilized. The desire for military action has been satisfied by largely
symbolic gestures (see William Pfaff,
The New Yorker, September 15).
And the charms of even these gestures are starting to wear thin . The
most telling critiques of the Libyan
escapade last spring came from
within the Reagan administration,
not from useless sods like Tip
O'Neill. The journey towards reality
is reflected in a piece of fluff like
Top Gun, where the typically corporate character of American achievement is admitted. Wayne, not to
mention Ayn Rand, must be stirring
uneasily in the tomb. The fact remains, "Top Gun" refers not to a
person but an institution. And an
educational institution at that. Tom
Cruise is going to end up as a tenured professor, helping other promising young warriors get their start.
However virile, he ts m fact going
soft.
Meantime, what does Sigourney
Weaver's future look like? Within
the world of the movie her fate is
unclear. Back in America she would
November 1986

make a great running-mate for
Mario Cuomo: maybe together they
can revive the nuclear family,
though I'm not quite sure what I
mean here by the term "nuclear."
Speaking more generally, beware
of liberals on the warpath. Especially
when in competition with conservatives, they have a lot to prove. And
sometimes (witness the Bay of Pigs)
they're willing to go about proving it
in the oddest ways. Anyone concerned with the future of the Democratic Party could do worse than
take a second look at Aliens. This
story is about more than fear of crab
salad.
tl

Still by the Path
On the shortest day
of a chill year
I walked the old
coast trail
all the trestles
taken up
one or two rusted spikes
still by the path
I sat in a column
of sun. The dog
lay panting in the dirt
I pressed fingers
in a raccoon's handprint
saw the earth
pale December brush
greening upward
Old spruces lurched
thick with moss
An aspen leaned abandoned
over the beaver creek
I watched all this
but what I could tell
I could not tell
Hush said the brown grass

The Critique of
Pure Boredom
James Combs
The tradition of the magnum opus
still lurks in the hearts of many
academicians. Sitting amidst the
collected book-and-paper flotsam
and jetsam of academical accumulation, they plan to write that Big
Book someday, the book that is the
fruit of their laborious reflections,
the remasticated wordworld of
years of doctoral dyspepsia.
I suspect that the secret hero of
such sheepskin-and-gown types is
Hegel, who spun out a philosophical system in massive volumes of
Gothic-castle German prose that
was so obscure it was taken to be
the height of profundity. Academic
castles-in-the-air are built with the
mortar of obscurantism, collapsing
only with the eroding force of
skepticism. It was Zeno who argued
that the cause of truth advances by
decreasing the amount of knowledge in the world, but that has
never been a popular project in the
hallowed halls of ivy, where
"knowledge" rises in unpuncturable
bubbles that float, like Aristophanes' balloon, above the Earth.
I have decided to write my own
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magnum opus. Following Hegel, it
will be a multi-volume tome entitled The Phenomenology of Pain. My
thought is that the world is equally
divided into two irreconcilable and
eternal groups in endless dialectical
struggle: those who want to increase the amount of pain in the
world, and those who want to decrease it. But, again as in German
philosophy, the outcome is not in
doubt: those who are committed to
increasing pain always win, and
those with silly notions such as "live
and let live" and "let well enough
alone" always lose.
History unfolds as the march of
pain in the world, toward its eventual goal of the realization of Absolute Pain. Freud missed the boat
when he didn't grasp the essentiality of the Pain Principle. Michels'
Law should read, "Whoever says
organization says pain." Weber's
"iron cage" of bureaucracy is run
by experts on the application of
pain, who constantly bend their efforts towards the question, how do
we make life more miserable for
people?
A glance at the nature of the
"postmodern" world illustrates the
triumph of the Will to Pain. We
live in a "service" economy whose
chief goal is to make life unserviceable, to grind everything to a halt,
make everything unworkable, inedible, or insufferable, and create a
world of total inertia. The service
economy serves only the cause of
Pain, and its managers have reason
to be proud of their accomplishments. The next time you are put
on hold by a "service representative" and have to endure ten minutes of Musak (while you are paying for the long distance call), think
of the pristine beauty of such pain,
and the genius it takes to think up
such ecstatic suffering.
One other contemporary example will suffice: education. The
great think-tanks, whose overall job
it is to conjure up yet more ways to
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inflict pain on the world, have recently discovered, through the excruciating joy of the organized pain
of committees, that, lo and behold,
Kids Hate School. Our children,
not yet appreciative of the fundamental necessity of a painful life,
must be trained from Kindergarten
on in the ways of pain. Discovery
that they resist mightily and seek
pleasures in sex, drugs, rock n'roll,
and blowing off school sends
alarms through educational establishments charged with surplus repression of the young. Their solution to the educational "crisis" is, of
course, utterly predictable: cause
the students all the more painschool till 5:00 the year around;
homework every night; no recess;
more science and math; mandatory
time at the computer.
Never mind that this will make
students resentful, neurotic, even
suicidal; indeed, their agony is
proof positive that our educational
"reforms" are working. If they seek
escape from the expanded drudgery of school in drugs, educators
have worked a double triumph:
they first create the conditions of
daily punishment that drive students to drugs, then punish them
for attempting to escape the unendurable. Such organized genius has
been termed "the politics of degradation": if you first create the circumstances wherein people are
forced to live degraded lives, you
can then degrade them for being
degraded. If the victims of poverty,
drugs, school, or other shameful
things are driven to despair, their
very despair becomes further occasion for increased degradation.
In any case, The Phenomenology of
Pain will be divided into several
major subjects. As is my wont, I
will discuss evidence from popular
culture as proof of the ubiquity of
pain. The Critique of Pure Bilk will
deal with the many ways in which
someone tries to separate us from
our money. The list is endless, but

special attention should be given to
greedy cable companies, Wall
Street insiders, up-front "finance
charges," Michael Deaverism, and
con artists everywhere whose sole
commitment is to pure bilk.
A second volume will focus on
The Critique of Pure Shill. The widespread practice of shilling-lying in
clever and covert ways-is essential
to the smooth functioning of a social order built on deception. If all
governments are run by liars, then
too so are all insurance companies
and used car lots. It is likely still
the case that the truth is so seldom
found because it is so seldom
sought, since it would collapse the
houses of cards built by the arts of
shilldom. Societies built on a commitment to truth would end work
for Presidential spokesmen, Pentagon "war is peace" rhetoricians, advertising agencies, public relations
firms, Hollywood agents, campaign
managers,
and
professional
wrestlers.
Another volume would deal with
The Critique of Pure Sleaze. Sleaze includes all those tawdry and cheap
things designed to appeal to prurient interest. They make our lives
more painful by making us realize
how much we Jove sleaze, and even
more how much we love to agonize
over the massive appeal of sleaze.
One only has to watch the movies
that people choose to rent at videotape stores to realize that Bloodsucking Freaks and Ilse, She-wolf of the
SS outsell My Dinner with Andre.
One genre of guilty pleasure always popular in the realm of sleaze
are
women-in-chains
movies,
wherein we take painful pleasure in
watching sado-masochistic dramas of
bondage, torture, and female revenge. The enjoyment of sleaze lets
us exercise our demon of repressed
pathological delights, and the even
greater pleasure of painful guilt
over enjoying it. Perhaps this is the
true social function of pornography:
pornography lets us dip ourselves
The Cresset

into the mire of sleaze, and afterwards love the pain of removing the
mud and leeches.
The reader by now has guessed
that The Phenomenology of Pain is a
vast enterprise far beyond my
meager talents and life expectancy.
Such a study should be the province
of a funded Institute for the Study
of Pain. There some other scholar
could write The Critique of Pure Ig;norance, dealing with the inexhaustible
ways that ignorance triumphs over
intelligence, thereby causing the
world more pain. Too, a volume
should be devoted to The Critique of
Pure Speed, how the concept of
speed wins out over comfort, for instance in car design, promotion standards, and beauty contests.
For my own humble part of this
great undertaking, I plan to start
with The Critique of Pure Boredom.
Boredom is one of the great resources in the arsenal of pain, and
contemporary
institutions
have
made boredom into one of the more
exquisite tortures inflicted upon us.
Those who design school curricula,
for example, are guided by the sole
question, how do we make school as
boring as possible? If you write a
textbook, the publishers insist that
the text be as devoid of interest as
possible; they know that those who
select school texts are concerned not
only with their orthodoxy but also
their tedium. In "higher education,"
the concept of the lecture serves a
similar function, transforming the
most interesting ideas into a ritual
drone that destroys any initial glimmer of student interest or comprehension. It must be the case that
the goal of education is to teach us
not how to live, but how to be
bored. If that is so, then American
education has succeeded admirably
in its task.
This includes political education.
Civic education has long insisted
that "citizens" are supposed to take
an interest in government. Yet the
truth of the matter is that the estabNovember, 1986

lished political order defends itself
by discouraging mass political interest. One of the ways it does this
is through the mystification of boredom. Governments survive by making themselves mysterious, using arcane language and procedures incomprehensible to the uninitiated.
But it also does this in a more subtle
way: the routines of government are
made to seem so boring that most
people conclude that what people do
in Washington is so dreary as to not
be worth the effort to understand.

The routines of
government are made to
seem so boring that most
people conclude that what
people do in Washington
is so dreary as not to be
worth figuring out.
This function of defensive droning is without doubt the only reason
for the existence of the ultimate in
narrowcasting, C-SP AN (Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network), carrying the doings of the House of Representatives, the Senate, Congressional committees, and the many interest groups that surround Federal
City. All day and night we are
treated to the endless spectacle of
talk-talk in hearing rooms, in
stuffy hotel meeting rooms, at rubber chicken luncheons and dinners,
in the well of the House. After
awhile a glaze comes over your eyes
as you listen to all these welldressed, earnest, and usually humorless people talk-lawyer talk, policy
talk, partisan talk, issue talk, technical talk, even rarely political talk.
Orwell once said that political
speech in our time was the defense
of the indefensible. He was wrong:
political speech in our time is the defense of the unendurable. C-SPAN
chronicles the stultifying series of

scenes of our national political tribes
talking largely to themselves. Parties,
interest groups, and thinktanks are
always talking to themselves, engaging in ritual orgies of self-congratulation and solemn reassurances of
the benevolence of their motives and
the relevance of their wisdom.
Indeed, C-SP AN is a vision of the
dismal science, political science. The
dramatis
personae
of
official
Washington revealed on that channel are people who have succumbed
to the ultimate academic folly, taking political science seriously. Yet
the triumph of the ethos of political
science contributes to the true function of C-SPAN, which is to support
the cause of mass political alienation
and acquiescence.
Nothing could be more forbidding
to the mass public than the prospect
of mastering the bleak arts and language of that discipline, and therein
lies C-SPAN's utility. For many viewers who happen across those many
occasions on C-SP AN in which political scientists are expounding, it
must seem to them as if they had
chanced onto the proceedings of an
obscure cult conducting odd rituals
and speaking unfamiliar shibboleths.
What they are actually seeing is an
image of academic Hell, an eternal
political science convention which
you are damned forever to attend,
condemned to sit in hotel meeting
rooms listening to papers and passing resolutions on a beautiful spring
day in San Francisco.
Yet C-SP AN does offer us a
glimpse of the American political
condition. Watching the insubstantial pageant of speakers and groups
that parades across the TV screen
convinces me that we are witnessing
a nation in the throes of imperial
stagnation. The political portrait
that shimmers before us is of a state
of political decay, without the crossventilation and -pollination of
dialogue, devoid of the political
passions of mass movements, a giant
languishing in the frustrations of its
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own creation.
The actors in the C-SP AN dramas
occupy themselves with the kind of
otherworldly concerns one associates
with the clerics of the Fourth Century A.D., polishing their points of
arcane policy analysis and rhetorical
flourishes in the isolation of the
monasteries of official Washington
while the temporal march of world
history passes inexorably by. Archeologists of the twenty-seventh
century studying the ruined temples
of Washington will be able to point
to many signs of our political demise, but none more telling than the
scene of lone Congressmen warning
of our impending fate speaking to
an empty House of Representatives
and watched out in TVland by practically no one.
Political boredom, then, is a
symptom of our political elite's inability to cope with the facts of our
political condition. Their reaction is
not one of hysteria but of self-reassurance, that things are as they ever
were, that the same ideas and habits
that have served us in the past still
work, that our destiny is still glorious despite the obvious historical
facts unfolding before us . Boredom
emerges when people have nothing
new to say, no spark of creativity or
daring, wherein the pain of pure
boredom is preferable to the pain of
reality-testing. There they stand,
talking on C-SP AN , paragons of
boredom, defending a dead Center
that cannot hold , visiting mere
stupefication on the world.
As the decades of the near future
unfold, they will talk us to death,
cushioning the pain of our passage
into senescence by the steady drone
of public talk, mastering everything
in word but nothing in deed. When
the day comes in the future that CSP AN is thankfully turned off, the
people on that channel will not be
missed. They will have achieved the
political Nirvana of pure boredom
and can disappear into the transcendent void of past Television, ephem-
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era of a terminally epigonic time.
They had found unity in the opposites of pain and pleasure, and ascended into irrelevance through
their exercise of mystical powers reserved only for the spiritual discipline of boredom.
It is not the first time observers
have witnessed the intellectual vacancy of an imperial power at the
point of its descent into rhetorical
self-assurance in defiance of history.
One does not even have to go back
to Thucydides. Recall Ralph Waldo

Emerson's thoughts on England in
decline: "It was as if inspiration had
ceased, as if no vast hope, no religion, no analogy, existed any more.
. . ." Intelligence was "choked by the
great consciousness of power and
money and rightness .... " Imperial
England was like "walking on a marble floor where nothing will grow."
C-SPAN, I fear, shows us nothing
but marble floors where no political
gardens are cultivated and no new
and nourishing political plants can
Cl
thrive.

Untold Lives
They have hooked the porch swing
to the ceiling and turned the picnic table
upside down , its legs two x's
crossing out the easy seasons past.
There is so much unfinished business.
The cold rains keep coming
pulling leaves to earth
bedding them thick and wet
in blackened sod.
Straggler sparrows dart south in twos and threes.
And so much still unspoken.
The skies lower, darken .
Squirrels race final acorns
home to storage in aching cheeks
and inside, Gra_ndfather tilts his rocker
before the fire, angling his shadow
back and forth across the floor.
So many plans overturned. So many hopes suspended.
How will we know, when snows
begin their final blurring,
smoothing furrows and fields to a shadowless sleep,
Grandfather, how will we know
what you have left untold?

Ruth El Saffar
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The Horror at the
Heart of Farce
John Steven Paul
At the close of the 1986 Stratford Shakespeare Festival's production of The Resistible Rise of Arturo
Ui, the actor who portrayed Arturo
comes downstage--out of character
now-and instructs the audience as
follows:
If we could learn to look instead of
gawking,
We'd see the horror at the heart of
farce ...
Stratford had horror and farce
on its collective mind this season.
While the Festival Stage was home
to the Romances, several of the
plays at the Avon and the Third
Stage turned on the juxtaposition
of fear and laughter.
The Young Company of the
Stratford Festival performed in
tandem Bertolt Brecht's parable
about the horrible rise of Adolph
Hitler from mobster to fuehrer and
Shakespeare's Macbeth. The Scottish tragedy is the model of mixing
farce with horror. No more have
the butcher and his fiend-like
queen left the stage, their hands

John Steven Paul teaches in the Department of Communication at Valparaiso University and writes regularly on
Theatre for The Cresset.
November, 1986

dripping with Duncan's blood, than
a drunken porter enters to deliver
his ribald dissertation on making
water. (Significantly, the porter was
played by Maurice Godin, who also
played Arturo Ui.)
Arturo Ui seems an appropriate
choice for production by the Stratford Festival. Brecht wrote the play
in 1941 while exiled in Finland. He
wished it to be performed in "the
grand style." Composed in a
slightly imperfect form of blank
verse, the text sounds "Shakespearean." Brecht quotes Shakespeare
frequently: Arturo learns to speak
Antony's funeral speech in its entirety, he cons an influential widow
in the presence of her dead husband's casket in the style of
Richard III's wooing of Lady
Anne, and Arturo's rise itself is
reminiscent of Macbeth's.
Brecht's "epic" dramaturgy owes
much to Shakespeare. The English
chronicle plays, especially, are both
grand and episodic, ranging freely
over time and space. Shakespeare's
concept of acting owed much more
to the rhetorical tradition than to
any notion of psychological believability. The Elizabethan would no
doubt have found the Stanislavski
system to be as ineffectual as
Brecht judged it to be contemptible.
From Brecht's substantial theoretic wntmgs and evidence from
Shakespeare's plays, we know that
they were not only theatre artists
but theatre scientists, even theatre
mechanics. They were dedicated to
knowing how the theatre works on
its audiences. They were committed
to developing their ability to make
a-ffective as well as e-ffective plays
for the theatre. The Shakespearean
corpus is a compendium of
rhythmic patterns, alternations of
crowd scenes with intimate scenes,
soliloquies and public addresses,
realism and fantasy, as well as horror and farce: all designed to catch
and hold an audience's attention.

For if the groundlings were restless, no one at the Globe would be
able to hear, much less grasp the
meaning of the poetry.
The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui
communicates to a 1986 audience
on several levels. The action is set
in Chicago and Cicero, Illinois, territory
for
which
"legitimate"
businessmen and gangsters fought
for control. Dogsborough (cf. Dogberry in Much Ado About Nothing) is
an aging, corruptible alderman
bribed by a group of food
suppliers, known as the Cauliflower
Trust, to provide it with a special
subsidy. Arturo Ui is a gang leader
seeking the official endorsement as
"protector" of the local grocers
against such calamities as arson and
murder. Such protection, of course,
doesn't come cheap.

The Young Company of
the Stratford Festival
performed in tandem
Brecht's parable of the
rise of Hitler from
mobster to fuehrer and
Shakespeare's Macbeth.
Arturo wins his endorsement by
blackmailing Dogsborough with the
threat of exposing his corrupt dealings, by intimidating the Trust, by
brutally maintaining control over
his own gang, and by demonstrating to the local grocers that he is
presenting them with an offer they
can't refuse. Finally all the grocers
in Chicago and Cicero "vote" to
pay for Arturo's high-priced protection.
Brecht's parable traces Adolph
Hitler's rise to power, a fascinating
story in itself. In Brecht's parable,
Dogsborough is Hindenburg, president of the fast-failing Weimar Republic, who was co-opted by the
Prussian Junkers (i.e., the Cauli-
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flower Trust). Arturo is an out-oftown gangster, "a simple son of
Brooklyn," who paid his way
through college painting houses
and later came to Chicago with
seven buddies. Among them were
Roma( =Roehm), Giri( =Goering),
and Givola( = Goebbels). There is a
warehouse fire which stands for the
burning of the Reichstag building
in 1933. "The Night of the Long
Knives," in which Roehm and a
hundred of his men were murdered
on Hitler's orders, becomes a hotel
room scene where Arturo and Giri
murder Roma and some of his underlings. Brecht's Cicero is Austria
and from there Arturo will move
into "Detroit, Washington, Milwaukee . . . " a/kla Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Sudetenland, etc.

in g.
So Brecht led his action through
a series of dramatic and theatrical
devices that he designed to jolt his
audience back to an intellectual distance. The drama is based on incongruity. How is it that gangsters
out of Chicago are spouting blank
verse suggestive of Shakespeare?
Such a linguistic choice might raise
his characters to archetypes, but
the lines themselves are often
hilarious:

Arturo is an out-of-town
gangster, "a simple son
of Brooklyn," who paid
his way through college
painting houses and
later came to Chicago
with seven buddies.

Further, the pettiness of their actions-thievery, thuggery, namecalling, firesetting, even the occasional casual murder-reminds the
audience that these monsters were
really only bullies and punks.
In the theatre, Brecht exposed
all the machinery that the creators
of illusionistic productions had so
carefully hidden. We take many
such innovations as hanging electric
lighting instruments in full view of
the audience for granted now.
Each of these devices was designed
to keep the audience aware that
they were present in a theatre and
that the action onstage was a
show-not real life. As a show, it
was the content that should be
critiqued, not the means of production. A good Brechtian production
can be an exciting theatre piece
precisely because it is so openly
theatrical.
The Stratford director, Tom
Kerr, has loaded his production
with Brechtian theatre devices. The
early scenes are bordered by a
torch singer, "Dockdaisy," and her
rendition of "Chicago, Chicago,
That Toddlin' Town." Later there

Even the thought of the names
and deeds associated with the
Third Reich is unsettling. Images
reminiscent of the black swastika in
the white circle on the red field
evoke horror. The horror show is
potentially the most emotionally engaging of the dramatic genres. But
Brecht's theatre practice and drama
were grounded in his cardinal principle that an audience must not be
allowed to become emotionally engaged in the performance. Brecht
had no desire for his audience to
suspend its disbelief, willingly or
otherwise. For in relinquishing its
disbelief the audience was likely
also to have its reason extinguished
in a bath of emotion. Keep the audience skeptical; keep them think24

ARTURO. I did it all alone but for
the help
Of seven solid buddies standing by
Without a pot to piss in, like myself,
But firm in our determination, sir,
To carve ourselves that little piece
of goose
Which God Almighty cooks for
every Christian.

is other, less distinguished singing.
The faces of the cast are painted
with clown-white make-up (which
has the extra benefit of distracting
us from the youthfulness of the actors playing middle-aged and elderly roles).
Brecht's "titles," which he meant
to have projected on a screen above
the stage, have been transformed
into newspaper headlines. The titles were the playwright's primary
means of connecting Arturo Ui with
historical Berlin in the Thirties.
The headlines scream out the developments in Hitler's rise to
power, but the device doesn't work.
The audience is too far from the
headlines to be able to read them
and so they become not distancing
but distracting.
The most troublesome part of
the production is the prologue. It is
visually and verbally confusing.
Brecht used the prologue to introduce us to his characters. As the
focus shifts to each actor, he stands
on a large wooden box painted to
look like a toy block with a portrait
of the character's historical counterpart executed on one side. That
Arturo Ui is standing above Hitler's
portrait is clear enough and Dogsborough's visual connection with
Hindenburg is detectable, but the
relationship between the other actors and the pictures on their boxes
was confusing and annoying.
But none of the details could
seriously detract from the power
and pleasure delivered by this production. The energetic young cast
was a perfect match for Brecht's
combination clown show and horror story. Their acting struck the
compromise between psychological
realism which an American audience seeks and the presentational
style that Brecht demanded. (I wish
I could be as enthusiastic about the
Macbeth.)

Maurice Godin, in the title role,
was outstanding. He alone would
give us reason to watch the StratThe Cresset

ford Company in the future. Godin is able to transform Arturo from
a shrill, petulant forty-year-old adolescent to a hypnotizing demagogue, while retaining the laughable demeanor of Charlie Chaplin
in "The Great Dictator." Godin
m1m1cs the all-too-recognizable
Hitler
mannerisms
without
parodying them.
Parody, as
Brecht himself warned, could preclude the horror.

The centerpiece of this
production is the
tutoring scene. Arturo,
sensing that he is not
sufficiently impressive,
calls for an actor to
teach him the grand style.

The centerpiece of this production is the tutoring scene. Arturo,
sensing that he is not sufficiently
impresssive, calls for an actor to
teach him the grand style. (That
style, Brecht slyly inserts, got the
Actor fired for applying Shakespearean technique to an Ibsen
role!) The Actor, superbly played
by Lee MacDougall, gives Arturo a
series of highly artificial hintskeep your head up, as you walk, let
your toes touch the ground first,
fold your hands over your genitals-that together shockingly turns
Arturo into an only slightly
exaggerated image of Hitler. Later,
Arturo reinforces his demagoguery
with his new style to impress the
grocers. Underneath the speech is
played Wagner's overture to The
Flying Dutchman and the most evil
of cartoons is complete. Some of
the audience continued to laugh.
Others of us looked on with wonder and dismay, which we undoubtedly shared with Brecht. What hath
the Actor wrought? How is it
within the power of actors and actNovember, 1986

ing to turn the world upside down
by simply being very good at what
they do? How dangerous it is when
the wrong people capture the persuasiveness of the Actor for themselves. (And also, of course, how
the power of acting might be used
to set the world right!)
Actors and acting are also at the
center of Tom Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead.
Stoppard, like Brecht and Shakespeare before him, is fascinated by
the theatre and theatre people, and
by theatre issues, notably the question of reality and illusion: the substance of the one, the creation of
the other. It would take much too
much space to do this play the justice in analysis that it deserves. Suffice it to say that the play is Hamlet
viewed through the eyes of two
characters who, in production, are
often cut out of Hamlet: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. The only
Hamlet lines that we hear are those
spoken in the presence of these two
minor characters in the Tragedy.
The remainder is made up of the
two passing time and waiting for
something to happen. The resulting combination is one of the truly
great plays of our time. On one of
its many levels, the play speaks to
the question of acting on the various stages of life.
Let me throw critical shilly-shallying aside here and say, with
genuine gratitude, that viewing the
Stratford Festival production of
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are
Dead was one of the best times I
ever had in the theatre. Stoppard
has yet to write a better or richer
play than this, his first major one
that premiered in 1967. William
Dunlop and Keith Dinicol as the
leads found all the humor, pathos,
anger, and charm that Stoppard infused into Shakespeare's own
Hardy and Laurel. The play was
set in the later Edwardian period,
and the two were decked out in
identical dusters and motoring gog-

gles covering their British tweeds.
They carried plaid valises, which
looked as if they might hold all the
material accoutrements of their little lives.
John Wood's direction pointed
up much if not all the meaning in
Stoppard's dense, multivalent text.
Every time we had a moment to
consider whether with this play
Bernard Shaw had really been
matched, another epigram zinged
past and we were refocused toward
the vast stage at the A von Theatre,
happy prisoners of the production.
And John Wood was working
with a handicap. R & G was perfectly paired with John Neville's
production of Hamlet. The same actors played the same roles in both
productions; Hamlet too was set in
the Edwardian era (a popular
choice lately, but save that for
another time). Neville's Hamlet was
extremely lovely and light-footed.
In but three hours and fifteen min-

naming the child
one word
curl of a child
a morning wind
and wing of a word
a garden sun
and sing of a word
sweetcake child
on a tender loom
sleepening soft
in your mother's womb
here in the heart
of things to be
the rose of your word
rings out to me

joan vayo
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utes, the director got all the
humorous values and the play became as much a high comedy in
the drawing room as it did a high
tragedy on the battlements. On the
face of it, I would not call this interpretation wrong. Indeed, it was
in some ways refreshing. The New
York Shakespeare Festival's production of Hamlet last spring was
ponderous,
black,
occasionally
wrenching, but too often tedious.
The cleverness of Tom Stoppard
and the beauty of Rosencrantz and
Guildenstem Are Dead, however, is
that the existential farce at the
heart of the Hamlet tragedy is
gradually laid bare for the two
blokes. If Hamlet is a comedy, the
conceit breaks down. Indeed, in
this R & G, the Hamlet players were
playing farce, and thus there was
no distinction between Shakespeare's characters and Stoppard's.
It was clear that the Elsinore crowd
was nutty; there wasn't as much for
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to
discover.
R & G have been sent for.
They're not exactly sure who has
summoned them, or why, or what
will happen to them when they get
to the castle at Elsinore. But they've
been sent for, and it must be important. From the beginning, they
have little control over their lives;
they will spend most of the time
spectating.
On the road they encounter a
troupe of actors, which will become
the mediating force between them
and the Hamlet characters. These
actors in many ways resemble the
Actor in Arturo Ui. They play in the
grand style (you'll remember the
Hecuba setpiece from Hamlet) and
just at the moment they are down
on their luck. Typically, the actors
are overjoyed at finding an audience-anywhere. When R & G inquire into their specialties, their
leader lets it be known, with a very
meaningful glint in his eye, that
they'll do anything desired . How-
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ever, their true specialty is death
and killing. Some of the troupe are
better at killing, others are better at
dying: "they work as a team."
When they meet the actors, R & G
are momentarily amused. When
the actors move on, the two are a
bit unsettled.
The next time R & G meet the
actors, they are in dress rehearsal
for The Murder of Gonzago, the play
that Hamlet called for. It is an
especially sensational piece, chock
full of sex and violence and death.
But Guildenstern is especially disdainful of these actors, whose idea
of death , he says, is the manipulation of the mechanics of cheap
melodrama. He instructs them with
deeply ironic prescience:
GUILDENSTERN . . . . it's not
gasps and blood and falling
about-that isn't what makes it
death. It's just a man failing to
reappear, that's all-now you see
him, now you don't, that's the only
thing that's real: here one minute
and gone the next and never coming back-an exit, unobtrusive and
unannounced ....
We will hear that this is how
Rosencrantz
and
Guildenstern
die--off-stage-after they've handed
the letter from Hamlet to the En-

glish king. In the theatre, their
time ends with spotlight snapped
off. In the meantime, they have remained on the sidelines, watching
an unseemly melodrama played out
by the Danish royal family, and
within that another melodrama
played out by a troupe of decadent
actors. It all begins to appear to
them a a kind of absurd farce. It
might even have been funny, until
the horror dawns on them in the
persons of a pair of spies dressed
in dusters, and motoring goggles,
and carrying plaid valises, who are
rubbed out in the final scene of The
Murder of Gonzago.
I would be remiss if I didn't tell
you that at the very end of John
Wood's production, R & G are seen
riding off into the sunset with the
actors sitting atop their coach. It is
a cryptic ending, not to be found in
the script. It is a further elaboration of Stoppard's conundrums
knotting up illusion and reality. For
Guildenstern, joining these actors
may be the final horror. Or
perhaps he is simply grateful for
their performance, which has
taught him to look instead of gawk,
and has joined on to lend a hand
cleaning up the stage blood.
~~
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America's Foreign
Policy Game(s)
Paul H. Brietzke
Recent
events
in
Haiti,
Nicaragua, the Philippines, and
elsewhere have prompted desultory
reflections about America's foreign
policy goals. Our media has shown
many Filippinos blaming us for
Marcos and Haitians blaming us for
the Duvaliers. We have often carried this can before: for Nicaragua's Somoza, for the Shah in Iran
and Haile Selassie in Ethopia, for
Batista's Cuba, for Chiang Kai-Shek
m the China that never was
Taiwan. Whether and how we can
stop backing the wrong horse in
foreign races is the subject of this
column.
If our foreign policies seem antique and arcane, this may be because the policies trace their inspiration back to 1815. In that year,
Austria's Prince Metternich (with
some help) established the "balance
of power" of the Congress of Vienna. This balance consisted of, in
effect, several games of musical
chairs
played
simultaneously.
Countries periodically left standing
when the music stopped (after
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World Wars I and II and many less
serious incidents) got absorbed by
players strong enough to claim a
seat. So many players were absorbed over time that the games
had to be consolidated.
Many observers now see only one
Game left with two players-"us"
and "them"-and, we fear, only
one seat. If the music were to stop,
the player that is stronger, if only
by one client-state or ICBM, would
win the remaining seat and declare
the Game at an end forever. We
thus acquire missiles and clients as
if there is no tomorrow. Better
hold on to any Third World leader
we think of as ours, no matter how
corrupt, how repressive, how incompetent and unable to adjust to
change. These are the traits shared
by the Duvaliers, Marcos, Somoza,
Batista, Chiang, the Shah, and the
Emperor.
Admittedly, Americans sat on the
sidelines
for
many
years
(isolationism), watching with faint
amusement while others raced
around in the circles of musical
chairs. But we somehow came to
believe what we were told after
World War II: a "World Power"
like us cannot not play the Game.
Our instructors-Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, etc.-were mostly immigrants thoroughly steeped in the
traditions of Vienna and of congresses of all sorts. The instructors
never told us that a democratic
foreign policy would necessarily
lack the secrecy and decisiveness
that made Bismarck's gamesmanship (a balance of power Realpolitik)
so effective.
Prussia's, and then Germany's,
Bismarck could buy off his public
with welfare measures and dreams
of glory, and he could force an efficient bureaucracy and a prideful
military to do his bidding. Lacking
these game advantages, American
decisionmakers can at best emulate
the defensive balance-of-power

policies of Austria's Metternich.
These are policies suitable only for
a great power on the decline.
Like nineteenth-century Austria,
America seeks to hold existing lines
at all points, regardless of the
longer-term consequences. This
policy made sense for an Austria
which was going to go into eclipse
in the long run anyway-something
Metternich seemed to sense. But
this policy seems at odds with
America's very real power. Why
give up prematurely, particularly if
President Reagan is right in saying
that "America is back"? Why support the kind of Third World despot described earlier, when we
know that America's interests will
turn on what his domestic opponents are doing only a few years
later? Are our defenses as weak as
nineteenth-centurey Austria's, prone
to collapse like a flimsy wall when
a few (client-state) bricks are pulled
out?

If we still have power
yet cannot play the
Game effectively, why
not use this power to
change the Game and
invent new games that
we can play effectively?
The danger is that, following
Austrian policies, we will become
an Austria over time. If we still
have power yet cannot play the
Game effectively, why not use this
power to change the Game and invent new games that we can play
effectively? Some Third World
countries are trying to change the
Game through the Nonaligned
Movement, but they lack the power
to be really successful.
Palestinians, on the other hand,
were never allowed to play the
Game, so they invented a new
game and seek to compel others to
27

play, as do the IRA, OPEC, and
some Islamic fundamentalists. The
United Nations is particularly
popular among Third World countries: musical chairs is played, yet,
when the music stops, everyone except Israel and South Africa has a
viable seat-at least in the General
Assembly. Why don't we follow
suit and create games more to our
liking and to our own, democratic
advantage?
Democracy begins at home, but if
we show only autocracy and the
mailed fist abroad, our democracy
comes to smack of hypocrisy. Even
worse for us, the perceived need
for autocracy abroad becomes a
convenient justification for curbs
on democracy at home. Our
foreign policy Game-players cannot
act with confidence while receiving
stabs in the back from the home
front. Call this the Vietnam Syndrome, interpret it how you like;
apparently we must sacrifice either
democracy or those diplomatidmilitary ventures that will fail for lack
of sustained public support. A
bipartisan, consensus foreign policy
has eluded us precisely because
consensus was sought for the defensive balance-of-power policies
that are seen by some to have
failed over the past fifteen years.
It is both the strength and weakness of a genuinely democratic
foreign policy that it must be firmly
anchored in public opinion. Presidents and Congress reflect this opinion only imperfectly, chiefly because
they try to manipulate rather than
listen to it. You cannot fool most of
the people for very long; manipulation, perceived as undemocratic,
eventually leads to the dissolution of
a foreign policy consensus based on
false premises.
Since Vietnam at least, the premise of unmanipulated public opinion
is rather easy to state. It is the
Golden Rule of doing unto other
countries what we would have them
do unto us. That is, we try to display

28

a great deal of sympathy and to provide limited amounts of real help.
But because we want no foreign interventions here, Americans wish to
intervene abroad only on the
clearest proof of a government seriously harming others, its citizens,
and/or ourselves.
Americans know something that
their foreign policy "experts" do
not: recently-stated Administration
goals of a "free and independent"
Afghanistan and Pakistan are implausible and all but irrelevant to
our security (as opposed to Game)
interests. Public opinion here seems
to follow John Stuart Mill's "principle of self-regarding conduct." That
is, we want to support a foreign regime only if we, as its citizens, would
be prepared to live under that regime.

You can't fool most of
the people for very long;
manipulation, perceived
as undemocratic, leads
finally to a collapse
of a policy consensus
based on false premises.
This amounts to a principle of
empathy: Americans realize that life
abroad is not like life in America,
and that life could be made at least
tolerable within the socio-economic
constraints a foreign regime faces.
Rebels in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, and the incumbents in Pakistan, flunk this test and thus receive
little support from the American
public.
Mill's principle offers a more reliable basis for our foreign policy
than does a balance-of-power politics. The public is admittedly fickle
or ignorant on occasion. But an informed, unmanipulated public opinion would not have tolerated ardent
and protracted support for Marcos,

Somoza, et al. A policy based on this
opm10n would have been to
America's advantage. More to the
point, an unmanipulated American
public would give little support to
extant leaders who are corrupt, repressive, and incompetent: the current South African regime, King
Hassan of Morocco, Mobuto of
Zaire, the Saudi princes, and a
dozen or so others.
Paradoxically, our government
gives its strongest support to regimes such as these-perhaps because they are most at risk of being
overthrown-regimes that merit the
least support from the American
public. The paradox is compounded
when the Soviet Union, with less to
worry about from its public's opinion, can frequently take the side of
the angels: the opposite side that the
American public would be on, if it
could.
The Soviets are also playing the
Game, of course. Fortunately, they
seem no more adroit than us. They
could hardly cope with a few more
"successes" like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and even Cuba. In any event,
all regimes aspire to the substance
rather than the pretense of sovereignty; there is little to choose between being a Soviet puppet and
being ours.
President Carter fell in with the
Brzezinski Gamesmanship that used
to be called brinksmanship under
John Foster Dulles. But Carter also
sensed a basis for the slow reorienting of American foreign policy: rewarding and sometimes punishing
regimes according to their records
on human rights and development.
This is the kind of foreign policy
that could command a consensus because Americans empathize with
credible efforts to promote freedom and well-being.
Like much else during the Carter
Administration, this policy was implemented so incompetently as to
give it a bad name. It should be resurrected m a more imaginative
The Cresset
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form, if for no other reason than
that certain regimes deserve our
strongest support under it. Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippinesgenuine democracies emerging from
long nights of military/martial law
rule, taking hesitant steps to promote development and punish human rights abuses-are for these laudable reasons the strongest bulwarks
against communism in their regions.
We support these regimes, of
course, but we should underline our
pleasure with much additional support.
There are stable regimes in other
countries, which make serious
human rights and development efforts yet are guilty of a recurrent
backsliding. Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Algeria, Costa Rica, India, and
Malaysia come to mind. Such regimes should receive our moderate
support, with reliable promises of
more support forthcoming as additional progress is made.
With much of our bilateral
foreign aid and diplomatic support
spent in this fashion, most other
Third World countries should be
treated to our benign neglect. They
should get prompt humanitarian aid
when needed. Imaginative ways to
deliver such aid, with a minimum of
siphoning-off by a regime deserving
our neglect, must be developed
along the lines pioneered by Oxfam
and Save the Children.
Opposition groups which offer
credible, desired alternatives to these
regimes should get our support.
This support would have to be cautious and non-military, and Americans would have to realize that the
alternative these groups propose
would be a social democracy rather
than our beloved liberal democracy .
Only a few "outlaw" regimes merit
our active opposition. Chile's and
South Africa's are rather obvious
examples; Nicaragua's has done
nothing to warrant more than our
benign neglect.
Needless to say, the foreign policy
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I outline is very different from the
Reagan Administration's. Its officials
score the Game by coloring a world
map either in red (them) or in blue
(us). But you can see progress even
there, if you look hard enough.
President Reagan did not support
Marcos and Baby Doc Duvalier
down to their last gasp. The Great
Communicator has not been very
successful in communicating some of
his wilder foreign policy aims.
This brings us to what is perhaps
the most difficult aspect of a democratic foreign policy: how can we insure that information is not manipulated and that the public takes an interest in it? The short answer is that
we cannot. To be a politician is to
manipulate information to your advantage, if you can get away with it.

The foreign policy I
outline is very different
from the Reagan
Administration's. It
scores the Game by
coloring the map either
red (them) or blue (us).
The least we can hope for is that
our media is sufficiently free for the
truth to come out eventually. The
public will then take an interest and
even punish the manipulators if the
truth is sufficiently outrageous. Recollecting Vietnam, this process can
take a long time. Reagan can apparently "get away with" Grenada or
Libya-the whole thing is over before the public can learn much
about it-while his more complex
aims in Lebanon and Nicaragua will
necessarily unfold slowly enough for
democratic curbs to become available. Unfortunately, a nuclear war
would likely be long over before any
surviving public opinion could exert
control. This is perhaps the best
reason for learning new foreign policy games to play.
Cl

Beyond Roles
Lois Reiner
Many of you know that Mother
was not always easy to live with.
None of us is, of course. But in the
case of Emma Dau Bertram, I
would say the problem had to do
with the fact that she had learned
too well what is society's Big Rule:
you are what you do. You and the
role you play in the world, in other
words, are synonymous.
But the role that she had performed so dutifully, so loyally, so
beautifully for almost 72 years had
been taken from her. She came to
us as widow-a role without clear
guidelines. Not only was she no
longer Dad's wife, she was herself
by June of 1984 in need of what
some might call "mothering." Consequently, she felt guilty and was
often bitter and more than a little
confused.

Lois Reiner, a frequent contributor of
prose and poetry to The Cresset, has
previously taught writing at Valparaiso
University and at Purdue North Central. She currently serves on the boards
of PACT (Prisoners and Community
Together), the Northwest Indiana Open
Housing Center, and the Christian
Community Action Board. These words
were delivered at the Memorial Service
for Emma Dau Bertram on june 6,
1986, at Immanuel Lutheran Church
in Valparaiso.
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She had not been able to convince herself that, as God's precious
child, she was much more than any
role society assigns for the sake of
Order. As long as she had been
able to perform wifely and
motherly tasks, she hadn't particularly minded having that voice,
which is inside all of us questioning
the human limitations of such
Order, effectively squelched.
Taking care of her physical
needs was no great challenge, not
even in the end when we had become her arms and legs. The almost overwhelming job, however,
was convincing her that she was
more-much more-than the roles
she had outlived. But in taking that
on, we learned more about what it
means to be human, got more back
in spiritual strength, than we had
bargained for.
We learned patience and humility and perspective, certainly. More
than anything, however, we learned
together the precious peace that
comes with activating the unique
non-role voices in each of us. To
make a very long and tension-filled
story short, let me say we ended up
as good friends. Mothering and
daughtering and son-in-Jawing had
nothing to do with that. As Mom
herself put it one November morning: "Everything's so different
here. But-I think that's good!"
She said other things signifying
proof of breakthrough. One afternoon we had just settled into the
car for our daily ride into the
country. Suddenly, as though she
had been trying to formulate it for
a long time, she said: "Sometimes I
think I'm already in Paradise. You
treat me like a queen!" The wonder in her voice suggested that she
was coming to understand that one
can still be loved and honored,
even without a specific role to play
in the world's scheme of things.
She was truly a delight when she
discovered that what she felt and
thought about everything from old
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and new experiences to theological
debates was worth sharing. "Now I
can make sense out of that!" she
exclaimed many times. How seldom
before she had ever been asked
what, or if, she felt and thought
about anything reflects how little
was ever expected of her outside of
prescribed duties.
Sometimes she would come back
downstairs long after we thought
she was asleep for the night, bearing heavy baggage. Sometimes that
baggage was in the form of old
hurts, but we won't recount those.
Eventually, she began unloading
new confusions.
One of these had to do with Pontius Pilate, whom she had always
considered a Good Man. At least
he had not condemned Jesus
Christ. But that particular day she
had read that Pilate had probably
ended up a suicide. Two hours of
continuous praying had not lessened her despair of her own salvation.
Then we talked about how none
of us is without sin; that God sent
His Son to pay for those sins-for
all time; that it's not what we do or
don't do, but only that we believe
that is our consolation. "Oh!" she
cried then, pressing her hands to
her lovely face, "tell me that again.
Every night!"
Two years of living with Mother
was not always fun. But we were
working hard together, until the
breakthroughs added up and all
her old demons seemed to have
vanished. And we could fight and
forgive, reminisce and venture forward in ways that now make me
want to weep with relief and
gratitude. Role-less, almost totally
dependent on us and others, she finally recognized that real living has
no set rules-is not orderly, efficient, predictable.
I am convinced she died knowing
she was loved simply because she
was God's beloved child, not because of her well-performed roles

somewhere along the line. "God
will reward you" was one of the last
phrases she uttered. Oh, how He
has, Mother! Thank you for setting
it up.

••
••

Good as Gospel
the pale sun
filtered through the oddly shaped
pieces of colored glass
and stripped the pew
in front of me
I was glad for the diversion
as the gospel was yet a long way
off and the epistle
was being sung by the choir
who had been coached by
Mrs. Tishauser in the proper
way of chairing epistles
the minister looked dubious
and belched into his hymnbook
the acolyte stood when he should
have sat and the congregation
ever on the alert
for new dimensions in worship
rose
then the minister had to rise
and the choir director thinking
that some kind of heavenly cue
cut the choir off
short
and I after all had my spectral
sunbeam oozing its way across
the lovely pleats
of the girl in front
in a perfect hush
with everybody standing
and
waiting
for the choir
or the minister
or the acolyte
and I smiled at that thinking
it good as gospel

J. T. ledbetter
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Law and Order?
Dot Nuechterlein
Ordinarily I consider myself to
be a conscientious, law-abiding citizen. But when push comes to
shove, I have to admit that there
are a couple of areas in which nonconformity and larceny dwell in the
heart.
There is one set of laws I used to
break regularly, having stopped
only because the situation changed
and temptation no longer exists;
there's another set I have transgressed nearly every day in living
memory, and still do.
The honest truth is, I am an international smuggler and a speed
limit scofflaw. And the really sinful
part is that I have never been able
to force myself to feel the least bit
guilty about either crime.
This all came to mind recently
when on the same day I read two
news items, one about international
customs and the other about
people who support the 55 m.p.h.
law, even though they do not personally abide by it.
When I lived across the border
the duty-free limits for goods allowed into that country were
minuscule. Of course I understood
the economic reasons for those limits-inexpensive, high quality commodities flooding into the land
could have devastated domestic
manufacturing and trade-but I
had grave difficulty applying that
system of thought to my situation.
Rationalization is a wonderful
thing, you know. Back in the USA,
where everything was cheaper and
better made, I often stocked up on
stuff like children's clothing,
California wine, and grocery items
that weren't available elsewhere. I
had no intention of reselling anything to anyone else; that was not
November, 1986

my country and I wasn't there by
choice; and the taxation level
seemed so repressive that my limited budget simply went much farther down home. And we are not
talking big bucks here: limited
budget it was, indeed. So I guess
somehow I felt myself to be exempted from the general rule.
Lest you think that someone else
might be incriminated by this discussion, let me hasten to add that
the other driver of the family car
never lied going through customs.
When he said we had only the limit
to declare, he thought that to be so.
One of us did all of the shopping
and packing, so only when I drove
through the gates was there ever a
smiling fib.
Only once did I make the mistake of telling him that I wanted to
take back a jug of wine (which was
too many ounces to be legal), and
he wouldn't permit it. He forcibly
removed the bottle from the car
and gave it to relatives; I didn't
speak to him for the next 400 miles
and several days beyond. Of course
he was right, but I didn't care. And
my only salvation in this whole
business is that I have moved back
home and no longer live with that
kind of "opportunity."
The speed limits are another
matter. I am one who just does not
believe the propaganda about staying alive at 55.
Perhaps the highway death rate
is down, as the experts claim; but
maybe that's because the population is growing older, and we know
statistically that older drivers have
fewer accidents per mile than kids
do. It can't be because people are
driving more slowly-in the past
decade I have done a lot of driving
all over this country, and there are
very few places where the speed
limits seem to be taken seriously.
When I was a child, my home
state of Indiana did not have an
explicit legal limit. The law said
something about driving at a safe

and prudent speed, given existing
road and weather conditions. The
fellow who taught me to drive,
whose last name I used to share,
was known as "The Flying Parson,"
because he drove safely and prudently according to current conditions, but never dawdled. I learned
to keep my wits about me and pay
attention to my driving, but I also
learned to move it.
Of course highways were not terrific in those days, and I can understand how we need some specific guidelines today, especially
since the number of people on the
roads must surely have increased
plenty in recent decades. It didn't
seem unreasonable to drive at 65
when that was pretty much the uniform law. But given cars with more
horsepower, plus the limited interstate system, 55 seems ridiculous. That must be why most drivers apparently feel themselves to be
exceptions, and race along their
merry way.
It's a good thing I wasn't around
during prohibition, because I probably would have been a sinner then
also. Oh, I don't drink a whole lot
and could practice abstinence without much trouble; I am also well
aware that Demon rum can wreak
havoc in many lives. But there is
something about legal action in
such matters that causes concern,
especially
when
it leads
to
wholesale disregard for the law,
and I tend to turn rebellious at the
very idea.
No doubt my philosopher friends
will point out the errors of my
moral reasoning, and no doubt
they will be correct. But my flexible
conscience refuses to give up the
privilege of making up its own
mind, so I expect that every so
often I will find myself on the dark
side of the law. But then, they always did tell us in criminology
classes that the line between lawkeepers and law-breakers was
pretty slim.
••

••
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For Good Reading
In a Glad New Year
In TimeFor Christmas
The herald angels' song is an everlasting antiphony ... It moves down
the centuries above, beneath, and in
the earth from Christmas to Christmas to Christmas . . . In it alone is
hope before death and after death ...
Their song lives to the 2,000th Christmas, to the 3,000th, and at length to
the last Christmas the world will see
. . . And on that fmal Christmas, as
on the first, the angels will know, as
we must know now, that the heart
which began to beat in Bethlehem still
beats in the world and for the world
... And for us ...

0. P. Kretzmann
The Pilgrim
Many years will pass before you understand Christmas . . . In fact, you
will never understand it completely
... But you can always believe in it,
always . . . The Child has come to
keep us company ... To tell us that
heaven is nearer than we had dared
to think . . . To put the hope of
eternity in our eyes . . . To tell us
that the manger is never empty for
those who retum to it . . . And you
will find with Him, I know, a happiness which you will never find
alone ...

0. P. Kretzmann
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